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Abstract 
My intention in this work is to investigate the apparent disconnect between the intended 
social purposes of inquiries and the impact pressures of juridification have had on them, 
and consider what steps inquiries may take to resist these pressures.  Public inquiries, 
formerly relied on as an alternative to criminal and civil proceedings and as a means to 
engage the public on issues of policy, now seem to exhibit more intense procedures 
akin to those found in the alternative processes they were designed to resist.  Under 
increasing juridification pressures, what function should public inquiries fulfil?  In short, 
my aim is to explore our understanding of public inquiries and the implications of the 
trend towards juridification is having on the ability of public inquiries to fulfil their social 
and policy functions. 
	   iii	  
Table	  of	  Contents	  
Abstract	  ..........................................................................................................................................................	  ii	  
Table of Contents	  ...................................................................................................................................	  .iii 
 
Introduction	  ..................................................................................................................................................	  1	  
 
Part 1: Purpose of Public Inquiries	  ..................................................................................................	  4	  
History of Public Inquiries	  ...............................................................................................................................	  4	  
Development of Public Inquiries in Canada: Provincial and Federal Legislation	  ...........	  10	  
Characteristics of Public Inquiries	  ...........................................................................................................	  12	  
Policy Inquiries	  .............................................................................................................................................	  13	  
Investigative Inquiries	  ...............................................................................................................................	  16	  
The Roles of Public Inquiries in Canadian Society	  .........................................................................	  19	  
Legal alternative to criminal trial	  .........................................................................................................	  19	  
Political alternatives to governmental decision making	  ..........................................................	  21	  
 
Part 2: Juridification and Due Process	  .......................................................................................	  23	  
Juridification in other areas of law	  ...........................................................................................................	  25	  
Evolution of the Criminal Trial	  ....................................................................................................................	  26	  
The “due process explosion” in administrative law	  .........................................................................	  31	  
Key features of the juridification of Public inquiries	  ........................................................................	  38	  
Conduct of Lawyers at Inquiries	  ..........................................................................................................	  40	  
Findings of Misconduct	  ............................................................................................................................	  43	  
The Role of Evidence at Inquiries	  ...........................................................................................................	  47	  
The Commissioner recedes	  ........................................................................................................................	  51	  
 
Part 3: Case studies	  .............................................................................................................................	  57	  
The Walkerton Inquiry	  ....................................................................................................................................	  58	  
Lawyers	  ............................................................................................................................................................	  61	  
Possibility of criminal charges	  ..............................................................................................................	  61	  
Evidence	  ..........................................................................................................................................................	  63	  
Role of the Commissioner	  ......................................................................................................................	  64	  
The Missing Women Commission of Inquiry	  .....................................................................................	  65	  
Evidence	  ..........................................................................................................................................................	  68	  
Lawyers	  ............................................................................................................................................................	  71	  
 
Part 4: Downsides of the Push towards Formality	  ................................................................	  77	  
Impact of Adversarial Pressures on Inquiries	  ....................................................................................	  78	  
	   iv	  
Leaving adversarialism at the door – Study Commissions	  ........................................................	  84	  
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions as an Alternative to Public Inquiries	  ...................	  87	  
 
Conclusion	  .................................................................................................................................................	  97	  
 
Bibliography	  ...........................................................................................................................................	  100	  	  	   	  
	   1	  
Introduction 	  
Public inquiries have a long and influential history in Canada.  Generally viewed as 
productive and positive process with the potential to have a profound impact on policy 
development, inquiries are often turned to in the wake of scandal and tragedy to provide 
the public with answers.  Inquiries such as the often praised Berger Inquiry from the 
1970s and more recently the Walkerton Inquiry are examples of inquiries that not only 
provided the government with useful and impactful recommendations but also 
succeeded in engaging and informing the public. 
Not all inquiries have, however, been able to achieve the same success.  Inquiries 
increasingly face new and complex pressures from the public for more transparency 
and involvement and from the legal profession to ensure the rights and privacy of those 
involved.  As a result, inquiries are becoming more complex and it is becoming more 
difficult for inquiries to find the appropriate balance between achieving their mandate 
efficiently and comprehensively while balancing juridification pressures.   
The challenges faced by recent inquiries, such as the Missing Women Commission of 
Inquiry1, are not exceptions, rather they reflect only a few of the increasing number of 
difficulties and criticisms that inquiries have faced in recent years.  While inquiries are 
often lauded for their flexible and less court-like nature, these advantages are also a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The	  author	  of	  this	  thesis	  was	  Research	  Counsel	  for	  the	  Missing	  Women	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  from	  October	  2010	  
until	  August	  2012.	  	  Additionally,	  she	  worked	  on	  the	  Braidwood	  Commissions	  of	  Inquiry	  as	  a	  Law	  and	  Policy	  
Researcher	  from	  August	  2008	  until	  December	  2009.	  	  	  Although	  work	  on	  these	  inquiries	  provoked	  the	  author's	  
interest	  in	  the	  topic	  of	  public	  inquiries,	  this	  thesis	  was	  based	  solely	  on	  research	  conducted	  for	  this	  thesis.	  	  All	  
opinions	  expressed	  are	  solely	  those	  of	  the	  author	  and	  based	  on	  research	  of	  publicly	  available	  sources	  and	  are	  cited	  
throughout	  the	  paper.	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significant area of criticism for many observers.  Many inquiries looking in to tragic or 
controversial events will often require some investigation and review of the actions of 
individuals and organizations.  The coercive powers of inquiries undoubtedly infringes 
on the personal lives of individuals involved in an inquiry, however, they do so without 
the protections generally associated with criminal trials and civil litigation.   
My intention in this work is to investigate the apparent disconnect between the intended 
social purposes of inquiries and the impact pressures of juridification have had on them, 
and consider what steps inquiries may take to resist these pressures.  Public inquiries, 
formerly relied on as an alternative to criminal and civil proceedings and as a means to 
engage the public on issues of policy, now seem to exhibit more intense procedures 
akin to those found in the alternative processes they were designed to resist.  Under 
increasing juridification pressures, what function should public inquiries fulfil?  In short, 
my aim is to explore our understanding of public inquiries and the implications of the 
trend towards juridification is having on the ability of public inquiries to fulfil their social 
and policy functions. 
In order to accomplish that goal, the approach I intend to adopt in this work is as follows.  
In Part 1, I will examine the historical evolution of public inquiries and draw out the 
conceptual and practical divide that has occurred as a result of the juridification process.  
Specifically, I will trace the development of public inquiries as the alternative to criminal 
and civil trials so as to promote public participation and social education.  In Part 2, after 
setting up the problem this way, I will turn my attention to the trend towards juridification 
in administrative law and public inquiries in particular.  Drawing on the historical 
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example of criminal trials, I will examine the slow, yet visible shift in public inquiries 
towards a greater reliance on criminal and civil trial procedures.  
In Part 3, I will provide two case studies of recent public inquiries.  First, the Walkerton 
Public Inquiry called in 2000 to investigate and report on the contamination of the city’s 
water supply.  The provincial inquiry involved both investigative and policy components.  
Although it faced many challenges it is often considered a success, especially in relation 
to the strong community support the inquiry was able to develop over the course of its 
work. The second public inquiry examined will be the recent Missing Women 
Commission of Inquiry.  Like Walkerton, the Missing Women Inquiry was a provincial 
inquiry called in the wake of tragedy.  The inquiry was established to examine and 
report on the Vancouver Police Department and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s 
investigations into missing and murdered women from Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside.  
The inquiry faced significant challenges from its inception and despite many similarities 
provides numerous interesting contrasts to the Walkerton Inquiry. Finally, in Part 4, I 
intend to utilise the insights gained from the first three parts in looking forward.  In view 
of the disconnect that has arisen between the original aims of public inquiries and the 
increasing juridification pressures facing them, the question becomes whether inquiries 
should be resisting these pressures.  
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Part 1 – Purpose of Public Inquiries  
This part will examine the unique purpose and process of public inquiries and their role 
in Canadian society. Public inquiries are neither civil nor criminal trials and should not 
be analogized to either.  Rather, as will be developed below, their role in the judicial and 
social landscape of Canada is one of public education and policy development. 
Royal commissions of inquiry, a long-standing part of the English system of government, 
were primarily established to investigate special problems that captured the attention of 
the public and government.  The first Royal Commission in Britain is claimed to have to 
have taken place anywhere between 1080 and 1517.2  The uncertainty of dates results 
from the fact that various writers have interpreted the term “royal commission” differently.   
 
History of Public Inquiries 
The early inquiries were established by British monarchs to assist them in governing: 
“the source of royal commissions is to be found in the generally assumed right of the 
Crown to appoint officials to perform duties temporarily or permanently on behalf of the 
King.”3  Ratushny notes that while Royal Commissions were evolving, parallel events 
were occurring in relation in the criminal trial.4 Following the Revolution of 1688, the 
political centre of gravity in Britain shifted from the Crown to Parliament and as a result 
the legal basis for Royal Commissions was removed.  Legislative committees, in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  J.C.	  Courtney.	  (1964).	  Canadian	  Royal	  Commissions	  of	  Inquiry,	  1946	  to	  1962:	  An	  investigation	  of	  an	  executive	  
instrument	  of	  inquiry,	  p.	  7	  
3	  Ratushny,	  Ed.	  The	  Conduct	  of	  Public	  Inquiries:	  Law,	  Policy,	  and	  Practice.	  Toronto:	  Irwin	  Law,	  2009,	  p.	  12	  quoting	  
Thomas	  J.	  Lockwood	  “A	  History	  of	  Royal	  Commissions”	  (1067)	  5	  Osgoode	  Hall	  L.J.	  172	  at	  179.	  
4	  Ratushny,	  p.	  12	  	  
	   5	  
comparison, were used liberally to inquire into a wide range of subjects that in the past 
would have been performed by Royal Commissions.   
The Canal Commission5 was the first Canadian royal commission of inquiry report was 
published in 1871, however, it is clear that inquiries also existed in Canada pre-
confederation.  Research suggests the first statutory provisions for the establishment of 
commissions of inquiry were introduced by the Province of Canada in 1846.6 At the time 
of the passage of the British North American At in 1867, Great Britain was experiencing 
the “Great Era of Commissions.”7  The considerable use made by British governments 
of royal commissions during the nineteenth century can be directly related to the post-
1832 social and political reform.  In 1907, Josef Redlich, writing about the extensive use 
of royal commissions in Britain commented that “almost all the great reforms of the 
nineteenth century in internal administration, taxation, education, labour protection and 
social questions, have been based on the full investigations made by royal 
commissions.”8 
Defining the purpose of commissions of inquiry is a challenging exercise given the 
broad range of functions and forms they take.  A commission can apply its wide-ranging 
investigative authority to ascertain facts concerning matters of substantial public 
importance as well as inform and educate citizens in ways judicial and legislative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Royal	  Commission	  to	  Inquire	  into	  the	  Best	  Means	  for	  the	  Improvement	  of	  the	  Water	  Communications	  of	  the	  
Dominion	  and	  the	  Development	  of	  the	  Trade	  with	  the	  North-­‐Eastern	  Portion	  of	  North	  America	  
6	  Robert	  Centa	  and	  Patrick	  Macklem.	  	  “Securing	  Accountability	  Through	  Commissions	  of	  Inquiry:	  A	  Role	  for	  the	  Law	  
Commission	  of	  Canada.”	  (2001)	  39	  Osgoode	  Hall	  L.J.	  117-­‐160,	  at	  117	  
7	  JC	  Courtney	  “In	  Defence	  of	  Royal	  Commissions,”	  	  (1969)	  12	  Canadian	  Public	  Administration,	  no.	  2,	  198-­‐212	  at	  
208,	  quoting	  Hugh	  McDowell	  Clokie	  and	  J.	  William	  Robinson,	  Royal	  Commissions	  of	  Inquiry:	  The	  Significance	  of	  
Investigation	  in	  British	  Politics	  (Stanford,	  1937),	  p.	  54.	  
8	  Courtney	  p.	  208.	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processes cannot.   Broadly, commissions may be defined as “sites of sense-making” 
through a social process where defenders of the status quo can engage proponents of 
alternatives to the status quo. 9 
Many commissions are also established to examine retrospective allocations of fault 
and blame.  These commissions run the risk of being little more than poor imitations of 
the civil or criminal justice system.  Such inquiries often draw criticisms about due 
process.  Despite the benefits of the former and the flaws of the latter, commissions of 
inquiry cannot be neatly divided into those that involve matters of public policy and 
those that investigate alleged misconduct.  Most inquiries perform both functions.10  
Some authors have suggested that rather than attempting to separate the two functions, 
a better approach is to view inquiries on a continuum with respect to the emphasis given 
to each aspect.11   
Though defining public inquiries is somewhat challenging, it is clear that the intention of 
parliament from early on was for inquiries to have open and transparent processes.12  In 
1921 the English Parliament enacted the Tribunals and Inquiries (Evidence Act).   
Significantly, the Act included a presumption that an inquiry should be held in public.  
Section 2(1) provided: 
A tribunal to which this Act is so applied as aforesaid… shall not refuse to allow 
the public or any portion of the public to be present at any of the proceedings of 
the tribunal unless in the opinion of the tribunal it is in the public interest so to do 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  G.	  J.	  Inwood	  and	  Johns,	  C.	  M.,	  &	  Canadian	  University	  Presses	  E-­‐books	  (OCUL)	  -­‐	  York	  University.	  
(2014).	  Commissions	  of	  inquiry	  and	  policy	  change:	  A	  comparative	  analysis.	  Toronto	  [Ontario]:	  University	  of	  Toronto	  
Press.	  
10	  Centa	  p.	  118	  
11	  Centa	  p.	  118	  
12	  Jason	  Beer,	  James	  Dingemans,	  and	  Richard	  Lissack.	  Public	  Inquiries.	  Oxford	  ;	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  
2011	  at	  p.8.	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for reasons connected with the subject matter of the inquiry or the nature of the 
evidence to be given. 
In addition, as in the current legislation governing inquiries in Canada, the 1921 Act did 
not include any provisions regarding the procedures to be adopted by the tribunal or the 
making of rules of procedures or practice.   
Justice Grange, commissioner of the Inquiry into Certain Deaths at the Hospital for Sick 
Children, commented on the importance of ensuring that an inquiry is open to the public.  
He said: 
I remember once thinking egotistically that all the evidence, all the antics, had 
only one aim: to convince the commissioner who, after all, eventually wrote the 
report.  But I soon discovered my error.  They are not just inquiries; they are 
public inquiries… I realized that there was another purpose to the inquiry just as 
important as one man’s solution to the mystery and that was to inform the public.  
Merely presenting the evidence in public, evidence which had hitherto been given 
only in private, served that purpose.  The public has a special interest, a right to 
know and a right to form its opinion as it goes along.13 
Following the activities and subsequent judicial reviews of two public inquiries in Ontario, 
questions were raised as to the fairness and utility of public inquiries.  As a result, in 
May 1990 the Law Reform’s Commission Report on Public Inquiries was initiated with 
Professor Kent Roach appointed as Project director to examine the utility of public 
inquiries and whether the benefits of public inquiries outweigh their costs.14  The Law 
Reform Commission of Ontario identified six principal functions of commissions of 
inquiry: (a) they enable the government to secure information as a basis for developing 
or implementing policy; (b) they serve to educate the public or legislative branch; (c) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  S.G.M.	  Grange,	  “How	  should	  lawyers	  and	  the	  legal	  profession	  adapt?	  In	  Paul	  Pross,	  Innis	  Christie,	  and	  John	  A.	  
Yogis,	  eds.	  Commissions	  of	  Inquiry,	  Dalhousie	  Law	  Journal,	  vol.	  12	  (1990),	  151	  at	  pp	  154-­‐155	  (emphasis	  in	  original).	  
14	  Ontario	  Law	  Reform	  Commission.	  Report	  On	  Public	  Inquiries.	  Toronto:	  The	  Commission,	  1992	  at	  p.	  1.	  (“LCO	  
Report”)	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they provide a means to sample public opinion; (d) they can be used to investigate the 
judicial or administrative (police, civil service, Crown corporations) branches; (e) they 
permit the public voicing of grievances; (f) they enable final action to be postponed.15   
These functions place public inquiries in a unique and powerful public policy role.  While 
the multi-purpose and indeterminate nature of the policy objectives of inquiries make it 
difficult to assess an inquiry’s effectiveness, many continue to note that the key function 
of public inquiries is preparing an “equitable solution to the problem submitted to it.”16  
Following their comprehensive review of inquiries, the Commission put forward a 
number of recommendations.  Among the recommendations were four guiding 
principles.  They included: (a) the independence of public inquiries from the executive 
and the Legislature should be recognized and protected; (b) the prejudice suffered by 
individuals affected by public inquiries should be minimized; (c) public inquiries should 
facilitate public involvement; and (d) efforts should be made to enhance the 
effectiveness and efficiency of public inquiries, while respecting the need for fairness, 
independence and participation.17 
In his dissenting opinion of the judicial review regarding the Westray Mine Inquiry, 
Justice Peter Cory elaborated that inquiries, which are also born of scandals and 
disasters, have a further purpose: 
One of the primary functions of public inquiries is fact-finding.  They are often 
convened, in the wake of public shock, horror, disillusionment, or scepticism, in 
order to uncover “the truth”…In times of a public questioning, stress and concern 
they provide the means for Canadians to be apprised of the conditions pertaining 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Ratushny	  p.	  16	  
16	  LCO	  Report	  p.	  10	  
17	  LCO	  Report,	  p.	  214	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to a worrisome community problem and to be part of the recommendations that 
are aimed at resolving the problem.18 
The Federal Court of Appeal, examining the issues surrounding the Inquiry on the Blood 
System19, referred to Cory, J.’s judgment in the SCC’s decision of the judicial review of 
the Westray Mine Inquiry to highlight the importance and limits of the inquiry system to 
the democratic culture of Canada: 
This respect for the institution that the creation of a commission of inquiry has 
come to be in Canada must not, however, amount to blind respect. However 
legitimate and important the objective may be, it does not justify all the means 
that might be used to achieve it. The search for truth does not excuse the 
violation of the rights of the individuals being investigated. Individuals whose 
conduct is being scrutinized at a public inquiry conducted under Part I of the Act 
are so vulnerable and so powerless that the courts must not allow an inquiry to 
continue when a commissioner is ostensibly abusing his powers and 
transforming his role from investigator into inquisitor. The considerable powers of 
commissioners and the ready, numerous and often tempting opportunities for 
abuse make it particularly necessary that the courts be vigilant. As Mr. Justice 
Cory observes [in Westray, supra, at pages 139 to 140]: 
... [there is] the risk that commissions of inquiry , released from many of 
the institutional constraints placed upon the various branches of 
government, are also able to operate free from the safeguards which 
ordinarily protect individual rights in the face of government action.20 
 
Through fact-finding, analysis and recommendations, public inquiries facilitate the 
restoration of public confidence and act as checks on partisan or institutional politics.  
Ratushny notes that the “social function” of public inquiries transcends the policy 
recommendations by “serving an educative function and by transforming public opinion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Philips	  v.	  Nova	  Scotia	  (Commissions	  of	  Inquiry	  into	  the	  Westray	  Mine	  Tragedy),	  [1995]	  2	  S.C.R.	  97	  at	  para	  62.	  
19	  Canada	  (Attorney	  General)	  v.	  Canada	  (Commissioner	  of	  the	  Inquiry	  on	  the	  Blood	  System),	  1997	  CarswellNat	  213,	  
1997	  CarswellNat	  1368	  (Fed.	  C.A.)	  
20	  Canada	  (Attorney	  General)	  v.	  Canada	  (Commissioner	  of	  the	  Inquiry	  on	  the	  Blood	  System),	  1997	  CarswellNat	  213,	  
1997	  CarswellNat	  1368	  (Fed.	  C.A.)	  at	  para.	  32.	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through a form of dialogue.”21  Ratushny highlights the independence and effectiveness 
of public inquiries in restoring public confidence in the institution or institutions 
investigated as well as government as a whole.  Further, the transparency of public 
inquiries encourages confidence in a commission’s ability to effectively determine the 
facts associated with the issue.  The process of conducting open and public hearings is 
an important component of the process of restoring public confidence. 22  The result of 
the unique functions, powers and processes granted to inquiries has generally led to 
significant and important policy recommendations that have helped shaped Canadian 
society. 
 
Development of Public Inquiries in Canada: Provincial and Federal Legislation 
The present law of public inquiries in Canada is composed of the provisions in the 
various provincial acts governing inquiries23, the Inquiries Act24, judicial decisions 
interpreting those Acts, judicial decisions regarding the common law governing the 
review of agencies including public inquires, and several constitutional provisions 
defining the limits of the public inquiry process.   
In 1971 the Royal Commission into Civil Rights25 led to significant changes of the 
legislation governing public inquiries in Ontario. The 1971 amendments clarified the 
“rights and responsibilities of persons who may be brought before public inquiry” and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Ratushny	  p.	  16	  
22	  Ratushny,	  p.	  18.	  
23	  Currently	  all	  provinces	  have	  enacted	  legislation	  governing	  public	  inquiries	  for	  matters	  under	  their	  jurisdiction.	  
24	  R.S.C.,	  1985,	  c.	  I-­‐11	  
25	  Royal	  Commission.	  Royal	  Commission	  Inquiry	  Into	  Civil	  Rights.	  Ottawa:	  Queen's	  Printer,	  1968.	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“the procedure to be followed by a commission in the conduct of that inquiry”.26 Prior to 
1971, Ontario followed the model adopted by many jurisdictions, which granted a 
commissioner the same power to enforce the attendance of witnesses and to compel 
testimony and produce documents as powers held by the court in civil cases.27  The 
Commission’s recommendation led to amended provisions that limited and clearly set 
out the powers of inquiries to summons witnesses and to produce documents.  Similar 
amendments were eventually integrated in many jurisdictions across Canada. 
The Law Reform Commission of Canada emphasized the distinction between 
commissions that primarily advise and those that primarily investigate: 
Broadly speaking, commissions of inquiry are of two types.  There are those that 
advise.  They address themselves to a broad issue of policy and gather information 
relevant to that issue.  And there are those that investigate.  They address 
themselves primarily to the facts of a particular alleged problem, generally a problem 
associated with the functioning of government.  Many inquiries both advise and 
investigate… But almost every inquiry primarily either advises or investigates.28 
While this thesis is primarily focused on investigative inquiries, it should be noted that, 
as the Law Commission Report observed, investigative inquiries also often implicitly 
“advise” through fact finding by making recommendations or highlighting systemic 
failures that require remediation.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Hon.	  A.F.	  Lawrence,	  in	  Ont.	  Leg.	  Deb.,	  4th	  Sess.,	  28th	  Leg.	  (June	  24,1971),	  at	  3179.	  	  (taken	  from	  LCO	  report	  p.	  9)	  
27	  See	  the	  Public	  Inquiries	  Act,	  R.S.O.	  1960,	  c	  323,	  s.	  2	  
28	  Law	  Reform	  Commission	  of	  Canada,	  Administrative	  Law:	  Commissions	  of	  Inquiry.	  Working	  Paper	  No.	  17	  (Ottawa:	  
The	  Commission,	  1977)	  at	  13.	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Characteristics of Public Inquiries 
As previously mentioned, public inquiries come in all federal and provincial shapes and 
sizes, ranging from far-reaching research commissions to reflective investigations into 
specific actions that contributed to a particular public crisis.   This section examines the 
characteristics of these two types of inquiries, what their goals are and what processes 
they adopt to reach those goals. 
Though federal and provincial statutes share many common features regarding the 
establishment and conduct of public inquiries, the Inquiry Act in BC is one of the few 
that clearly distinguishes between investigative (or hearing) and policy (or study) 
inquiries.  The Act clearly distinguishes the powers of each type of inquiry.  While other 
jurisdictions have chosen not to codify the distinction, a general discussion of the two 
types of inquiries is useful in examining the difference between their powers, functions 
and uses as whether explicitly recognized as such or simply used in these two ways the 
distinction is pervasive across the country.  The distinction is especially important given 
the experience of a recent inquiry in BC.  The Missing Women Commission of Inquiry, 
which will be examined in greater detail below, experienced significant challenges as a 
result of this distinction.  Rather than viewing the two functions of the inquiry as 
complimentary, a number of organizations, individuals and interest groups viewed the 
policy study as inferior and as a result, boycotted the process. 
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Policy Inquiries 
Policy or advisory inquiries are focused almost entirely on public policy formulation. 
While they involve some of the general purposes of inquiries set out above they also 
engage the “social function” through the education of the public, which in turn often 
influences policy formulation.  Participation and process have a significant impact on the 
outcome of inquiries of this kind.   Often, policy inquiries involve gathering and 
conducting research as well as consulting “experts” in several relevant fields.29  Policy 
inquiries are able to bring together diverse views and, as a result, hopefully elevate the 
level of discussion. Their interdisciplinary nature generally reflects the reality that the 
societal problems rarely fall into a single discipline. 
Commentators have suggested that policy inquiries are often required to be more 
“political” than their investigative counterparts if their recommendations are to be 
adopted.30    This means that policy inquiries will not only have to consult the public but, 
at the same time, raise the level of public discussion by educating the public.  Public 
interest groups representing many narrow “interests” must be heard from and their 
information balanced against the consequences potential changes may have upon 
stakeholders.   
As policy inquiries are, most often, focused on broad issues, the recommendations and 
policy changes that are developed are often incremental in nature and their impact is 
not often felt immediately.   The secretary to the Macdonald Commission noted: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Ratushny,	  p.	  50	  
30	  Ratushny,	  p.	  50	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I would not suggest that the main test of the usefulness of a commission is to 
tally up the recommendations that were adopted by government within the next 
five years and those that were not.  Far more important is, “did the work of the 
commission influence the course of public policy?” a much more difficult question 
to answer.  It is a deeper question and it relates to values and to public policy 
formation. 31 
While specific events may be the catalyst leading to the creation of policy inquiries, their 
origins have much deeper roots, requiring a more fundamental approach.32  Some 
examples of policy inquiries that have taken place in Canada include: 
• The tragedy of families being unable to afford medical treatment during the Great 
Depression, leading to a comprehensive system of public “medicare”33; 
• The crisis in Confederation arising out of the political developments in Quebec in 
the 1960s leading to policies of bilingualism and multiculturalism34; 
• Systemic discrimination in employment leading to policies of affirmative action in 
the form of “employment equity” and corresponding legislation35; and 
• Social, economic and political issues relating to Aboriginal Peoples in Canada, in 
particular, the issue of self-government.36 
 
Because specific events may stimulate the formation of an inquiry, many investigative 
inquiries also have a policy component, however, these tend to be more narrow and 
directly related to the specific event or conduct under investigation.  For example, the 
Braidwood Inquiry investigated the tragic events that led to the death of a Polish 
immigrant at Vancouver’s international airport.  However, it was also directed to inquire 
into and to report on the use of conducted energy weapons (Tasers) in British Columbia, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  J.G.	  Godsoe,	  Q.C.	  “Comments	  on	  Inquiry	  Management”	  in	  A.P.	  Pross,	  I.	  Christie,	  &	  J.A.	  Yogis,	  eds.,	  Commissions	  
of	  Inquiry	  (Toronto:	  Carswell,	  1990)	  at	  72.	  
32	  Ratushny,	  p	  417	  
33	  Royal	  Commission	  on	  Health	  Services	  (1961-­‐1964)	  
34	  Royal	  Commission	  on	  Bilingualism	  and	  Biculturalism	  (1963-­‐1967)	  
35	  Rosalie	  S.	  Abella	  and	  Canada.	  Royal	  Commission	  on	  Equality	  in	  Employment.	  Equality	  in	  Employment:	  A	  Royal	  
Commission	  Report.	  Ottawa,	  ON:	  Supply	  and	  Services	  Canada,	  1984.	  
36	  Royal	  Commission	  on	  Aboriginal	  Peoples	  (1991-­‐96)	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and to make recommendations respecting their appropriate use.37   It has been 
suggested that inquiries “can be arranged on a continuum in terms of how they balance 
policy-making and investigation.”38  
Research is the foundation of a policy inquiry.39  As observed by Gerald LeDain the fact 
that policy inquiries serve of a broader “social function”, rather than investigating an act, 
that may be their most important contribution: 
[A] commission… has certain things to say about government but it also has an 
effect on perceptions, attitudes and behaviours.  Its general way of looking at 
things is probably more important to the long run than its specific 
recommendations.  It is the general approach towards a social problem that 
determines the way in which society responds to it.  There is much more than law 
and governmental action involved in the social response to a problem.  The 
attitude and responses of individuals at the various places at which they effect 
the problem are of profound importance. 
What gives an inquiry of this kind its social function is that it becomes, whether it 
likes it or not, part of this ongoing social process.  There is action and 
interaction… Thus this instrument, supposedly merely an extension of Parliament, 
may have a dimension which passes beyond the political process in the social 
sphere.  The phenomenon is changing even while the inquiry is in progress.40 
Policy inquiries are rarely focused on the actions of a specific individual or determining 
whether “misconduct” occurred.  Rather the policy inquiry process provides an 
opportunity for the public to experience “direct democracy” through participation in the 
development of policies together with those who will most directly be affected by those 
policies. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Braidwood	  Commission	  on	  Conducted	  Energy	  Weapon	  Use	  (B.C.),	  T.	  R	  Braidwood.	  Restoring	  Public	  Confidence:	  
Restricting	  the	  Use	  of	  Conducted	  Energy	  Weapons.	  Victoria,	  B.C.:	  Braidwood	  Commission	  on	  Conducted	  Energy	  
Weapon	  Use,	  2009	  and	  Braidwood	  Commission	  on	  the	  Death	  of	  Robert	  Dziekanski	  (B.C.),	  et	  al.	  Why?:	  The	  Robert	  
Dziekanski	  Tragedy.	  Vancouver,	  B.C.:	  Government	  of	  British	  Columbia,	  2010.	  
38	  Liora	  Salter,	  “The	  Complex	  Relationship	  between	  Inquiries	  and	  Public	  Controversy”	  in	  Allan	  Manson	  &	  David	  
Mullan,	  eds.,	  Commissions	  of	  Inquiry:	  Praise	  or	  Reappraise?	  (Toronto:	  Irwin	  Law,	  2003)	  at	  186.	  
39	  Ratushny,	  p.	  434	  
40	  Gerald	  E.	  Le	  Dain,	  “the	  Role	  of	  the	  Public	  Inquiry	  in	  our	  Constitutional	  System”	  in	  Jacob	  S.	  Ziegel,	  ed,	  Law	  and	  
Social	  Change	  (Toronto:	  Osgoode	  Hall	  Law	  School,	  1973),	  at	  85.	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Investigative Inquiries 
Investigative commissions of inquiry are often established to investigate issues resulting 
from a tragedy or a political scandal.  Unlike policy inquiries, investigative inquiries have 
the much more narrow focus of determining the facts of an event and, oftentimes how to 
prevent such an event from occurring in the future.  
In BC, the Public Inquiries Act governs commissions of inquiries.  Under this Act, the 
provincial government may appoint a commissioner by Order in Council to conduct an 
inquiry into and report on: 
(a) the state and management of the business, or any part of the business, of 
that ministry, or of any branch or institution of the executive government of British 
Columbia named in the order, whether inside or outside that ministry, and 
(b) the conduct of any person in the service of that ministry or of the branch or 
institution named, so far as it relates to the person's official duties.41 
The commission of inquiry is empowered to investigate matters relevant to its mandate 
as defined in the Terms of Reference set out in the Order in Council, and to report its 
findings and recommendations (if required) to the government.  To exceed the mandate, 
or to violate the requirements of the Act, is an error of jurisdiction on the part of the 
commission.  A commission must also be aware of and operate within the bounds of 
other statutes, the common law42 and the Charter.  Its decisions are subject to judicial 
review. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  Inquiry	  Act,	  R.S.B.C.	  1996,	  c.	  224,	  s.	  1	  
42	  For	  example,	  the	  rules	  of	  natural	  justice	  have	  been	  held	  to	  apply	  in	  inquiries:	  Re	  Yanover	  and	  Kiroff	  and	  the	  
Queen	  (1974),	  6	  O.R.	  (2d)	  478	  (C.A.)	  and	  Fraternite	  Inter-­‐Provinciale	  des	  Ouvriers	  en	  Electricite	  v.	  Office	  de	  la	  
Construction	  du	  Quebec	  (1983),	  148	  D.L.R.	  (3d)	  626	  (Que.	  C.A.)	  at	  641-­‐42	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The Supreme Court of Canada opined on the functions of inquiries in Philips v. Nova 
Scotia (Commission of Inquiry into the Westray Mine Tragedy).  Specifically, it noted:  
One of the primary functions of public inquiries is fact-finding. They are often 
convened, in the wake of public shock, horror, disillusionment, or skepticism, in 
order to uncover “the truth”. Inquiries are, like the judiciary, independent; unlike the 
judiciary, they are often endowed with wide-ranging investigative 
powers. In following their mandates, commissions of inquiry are, ideally, free from 
partisan loyalties and better able than Parliament or the legislatures to take a long-
term view of the problem presented. Cynics decry public inquiries as a means used 
by the government to postpone acting in circumstances which often call for speedy 
action. Yet, these inquiries can and do fulfill an important function in Canadian 
society. In times of public questioning, stress and concern they provide the means 
for Canadians to be apprised of the conditions pertaining to a worrisome community 
problem and to be a part of the recommendations that are aimed at resolving the 
problem. Both the status and high public respect for the commissioner and the open 
and public nature of the hearing help to restore public confidence not only in the 
institution or situation investigated but also in the process of government as a whole. 
They are an excellent means of informing and educating concerned members of the 
public.43 
 
The inquiry envisioned by the Supreme Court above most closely resembles an 
investigative inquiry that is fact driven and generally conducted in public.  In such an 
investigative inquiry the appointed commissioner is expected to get to the truth.  There 
is an expectation amongst the public and government that the commissioner will use his 
or her powers to ensure that an inquiry is both comprehensive and impartial. 44 
In the context of the Westray Mine disaster, Justice Cory said: “Open hearings function 
as a means of restoring the public confidence in the affected industry and in the 
regulations pertaining to it and their enforcement.  As well, it can serve as a type of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  Phillips	  v.	  Nova	  Scotia	  (Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  into	  the	  Westray	  Mine	  Tragedy),	  [1995]	  2	  S.C.R.	  97	  (S.C.C.)	  at	  para.	  
62.	  
44	  Gus	  van	  Harten,	  “Truth	  Before	  Punishment,	  A	  Defence	  of	  Public	  Inquiries.”	  (2003),	  29	  Queen’s	  L.J.	  242-­‐	  282	  at	  
245.	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healing therapy for a community shocked and angered by a tragedy.”45  Inquiries into 
the death of babies at Toronto’s Sick Children’s Hospital not only opened the issue up 
to the public but also highlighted the problems the state faced in attempting to solve the 
mysterious deaths and allowed the public to assess the effectiveness of the state’s 
actions.   
As established above, some of the most common features of investigative inquiries are 
open hearings driven by the goal of fact finding.  Generally these inquiries involve a 
greater participation of counsel, both on the part of the commission as well as for 
participants and witnesses.   Additionally, as these inquiries often focus more on the 
actions of individuals and organizations there tend to be greater procedural protections 
demanded and put in place.   
The nature and purpose of study and investigative inquiries are, as described above, 
different, unique and need to be taken into consideration when determining what the 
end goal of an inquiry is.  Although many issues may require aspects of both study and 
investigative inquiries, it is important to ensure that the unique features of both are 
respected and utilized to their best potential.  For example, investigative inquiries that 
rely on hearings to adduce evidence serve an important social function, namely 
providing the public with an open and transparent recording of evidence.  Although it will 
be up to the Commissioner to determine the facts, the public testimony provides the 
public with some sense of the events that took place and may also provide more 
opportunity for community organizations and groups to ask questions of those involved.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Phillips	  v.	  Nova	  Scotia	  (Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  into	  the	  Westray	  Mine	  Tragedy),	  [1995]	  2	  S.C.R.	  97	  (S.C.C.)	  at	  para.	  
117.	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The rules and procedures adopted by hearing commissions, especially in relation to the 
recording of evidence, tend to be more formalized.   Study commissions, on the other 
hand, do not rely on evidence taken under oath and as a result are able to operate in 
much less formal way.  Although related, it is important to recognized the distinct roles 
these two types of inquiries play, especially when discussing the rules and procedures 
which they employ. 
 
The Roles of Public Inquiries in Canadian Society 
As described above, public inquiries perform a unique function in Canadian society.  
Public inquiries are unique in their design for despite having a political genesis they are 
still, independent and flexible.  That said, there are a number of alternatives to public 
inquiries that governments may consider when deciding whether or not to establish a 
public inquiry. 
The sections below examine alternatives to the establishment of a commission of 
inquiry to address problems with a high profile issue that has disturbed public 
confidence.   
 
Legal alternative to criminal trial 
Many examining public inquiries have noted that the most common alternative to a 
public inquiry is a criminal trial.46  Investigative inquiries and criminal trials are similar in 
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that both involve the exercise of coercive powers by agents of the state to investigate 
and reach conclusions about past events.  However, inquiries differ from the criminal 
process insofar as their primary focus is not to determine a person’s culpability, but to 
determine what happened and how to prevent such an event from happening again.  
Generally, inquiries have a broader mandate, and while they may look at a specific 
event, the objective is to look into the cause of past breakdowns and/or to make 
recommendations for future reform.  This is reflected in the requirement that there be 
reasonable and probable grounds for commencing a criminal prosecution, and in the 
objective of criminal sentencing: to denounce unlawful conduct, to deter the offender 
and others from committing offences, to separate offenders from society, to rehabilitate 
and to make reparations for harm done.47   
Justice Krever, in his Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Confidentiality of 
Health Information, acknowledged the distinctive purpose of the criminal justice system, 
and consequently recommended that those whose conduct he criticized should not be 
prosecuted. He said: 
Prosecutions would involve a diversion of energy from the main and important 
task at hand, namely that of the fostering of sensitivity in order to ensure that the 
infractions that were committed in the past are not repeated in the future ... To 
undertake prosecutions would smack of a search for scapegoats despite the fact 
that the climate in which the activities described in detail in these pages, and 
which have been carried on until recently, is something for which all of us should 
feel responsible.48 
Issues of timing may arise, however, where there is both a criminal investigation and a 
commission of inquiry.  Consequences vary depending on the path chosen by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  van	  Harten,	  p.	  246	  and	  fn	  19	  
48	  Ontario,	  The	  Hon.	  Horace	  Krever,	  Commissioner,	  Report	  of	  the	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  into	  the	  Confidentiality	  of	  
Health	  Information,	  vol.	  1	  (Toronto:	  Queen's	  Printer,	  1980)	  at	  5.	  
	   21	  
inquiry.  For example, in the Air India case, the time lost while awaiting completion of 
the criminal proceedings reduced the scope of the Commission’s mandate.49  The 
Supreme Court held that a compelling public interest required the commission of inquiry 
to proceed in spite of concurrent criminal proceedings.50  
 
Political alternatives to governmental decision making 
Many public inquiries also serve an advisory function.  While this is especially true of 
policy inquiries, investigative inquiries also often produce recommendations for policy 
reform.   
Parliamentary committees are often put forward as an alternative to the policy functions 
of inquiries.   Used since the late seventeenth century, parliamentary committees have 
a longstanding history of examining less controversial and time-consuming topics.  
While they have a number of benefits, Parliamentary Committees are not without their 
faults.  The committees are only established for the length of a parliamentary session 
and are made up of Members of Parliament or Members of the Legislative Assembly 
with many other demands on their time and who may also face pressure from their 
parties depending on the subject matter being examined.   
A second policy alternative is to rely on the civil service to research and develop policy.  
This method has the advantage of utilizing a bureaucracy that likely has a significant 
amount of experience in drafting and implementing policy on a wide range of topics.  
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That said, critics have argued that the bureaucrats work under significant time 
constraints and may not be in touch with public opinion.  Also, as they are employed by 
the government of the day, they may also have difficulty in developing policy contrary to 
the political mandate of the ruling party.51 
Alternatives to both the investigative and policy functions of inquires, while useful in 
certain contexts, rarely offer all of the functions of inquiries.  This demonstrates the 
unique function public inquiries offer to governments. Not only can they provide an 
independent examination of a controversial issue, they are also able to investigate, 
research and develop policy alternatives to address the issues before them.  In addition, 
the public nature of inquiries also serves the added functions of educating and involving 
the public.  The flexibility and nimbleness of inquiries is crucial to their continued 
contribution to Canadian society.   This is especially true of investigative or hearing 
commissions.  Without flexible procedures in areas such as the collection of evidence 
and participation inquiries would, in essence, mimic courts, albeit without findings of 
liability. 
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Part 2 – Juridification and Due Process  
The tendency towards an increase in formal law and process, or juridification, has had a 
significant impact on the development of administrative law, and law generally in 
Canada.  Juridification has been described as being “the proliferation of law,” “the 
monopolization of the legal field by legal professionals,”52 “the construction of judicial 
power,” and the “expansion of judicial power.”53  Juridification has been noted as the 
hallmark of a constitutional democracy, a representation of the triumph of the rule of law 
over despotism.54   
 
One of the primary characteristics of the past forty years of administrative law in 
Canada can has been the proliferation of the demand for due process.  Commentators 
have gone so far as to characterize it as a “due process explosion”.55  Developments in 
common law have led to a significant increase in procedural protections the State is 
required to provide to those with whom it deals.56  Generally, the greater focus on 
procedural fairness in administrative processes has been regarded as a positive 
development as it is an indispensable part of sound administrative practices.  However, 
concerns have also been raised regarding the extent to which procedural fairness 
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obligations have been imposed on or adopted by some decision-makers.57 
Commentators have pointed out that tribunals are almost indistinguishable from regular 
courts in their procedures and that they function in the manner of a traditional 
adversarial adjudicative model.58   
In Part 1 I examined the unique purpose and process of public inquiries. Specifically, I 
highlighted the fact that inquiries are neither a civil nor a criminal trial, nor should they 
be analogized to either.  Justice Cory elaborated on this difference: 
A commission of inquiry is neither a criminal trial nor a civil action for the 
determination of liability. It cannot establish either criminal culpability or civil 
responsibility for damages. Rather, an inquiry is an investigation into an issue, 
event or series of events. The findings of a commissioner relating to that 
investigation are simply findings of fact and statements of opinion reached by the 
commissioner at the end of the inquiry. They are unconnected to normal legal 
criteria. They are based upon and flow from a procedure which is not bound by 
the evidentiary or procedural rules of a courtroom.  There are no legal 
consequences attached to the determinations of a commissioner. They are not 
enforceable and do not bind courts considering the same subject matter.59 
Given that the administrative law process, and public inquiries in particular, was initially 
envisioned as an alternative to the traditional adversarial court process to ensure 
greater accessibility, timeliness and efficient decision-making, questions have been 
raised as to whether procedures designed and adopted in adversarial proceedings 
compromise these goals.  Have the procedurally bound tribunals and inquiries come to 
a point where their intended purpose is being hampered?   
This part will explore the history of the increase of due process in criminal and 
administrative law.  First, the juridification of criminal law will be reviewed.  Though 	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criminal law may seem like an odd comparison with administrative law, its development 
from a trial by ordeal to the adversarial process we are familiar with today provides a 
good example of the impacts of juridification on the legal system.  The second topic 
examined in this part will shift back to administrative law and look at the trend towards 
juridification in many areas of administrative law.  The part will then explore some of the 
key features of the juridification of public inquiries, specifically adversarialism and the 
rise of lawyers, the role of evidence and the role of the commissioner.  Finally, three 
public inquiries will be examined with a focus on the challenges they faced in these 
areas.   
 
Juridification in other areas of law 
From a historical perspective, the trend towards juridification in administrative law is not 
unprecedented.  The criminal trial underwent a similar evolution in the late eighteenth 
century, shifting from a lawyer-free process to one dominated by lawyers and more 
stringent procedures. Throughout history pubic inquiries and criminal trials have 
overlapped.  Often in cases in which a tragic event has taken place there is also an 
element of criminality.  While the criminal deed is examined and adjudicated by the 
courts, the larger issue of preventing future incidents often remains.   
Public inquiries may be seen as a something of a historical response to the juridified 
criminal trial.  Public inquiries provide a public arena for the community to examine the 
issues that a criminal trial is unable to address – the questions of why the event 
happened and how to prevent it from happening again.  Given the tendency towards 
	   26	  
juridification in administrative law and the close connection between criminal trials and 
public inquiries, the development of the adversarial criminal trial provides an interesting 
comparison to the juridification of public inquiries.  Below, the evolution of the criminal 
trial is used as an example of how the juridification of the criminal hearing process came 
to be dominated by lawyers.  This provides an interesting comparison for inquiries as 
lawyers are becoming increasingly involved in many aspects of inquires and are, like in 
criminal trials, changing the way in which evidence and information is being provided 
and portrayed.  Relying on the work of legal historian John Langbein, the following 
section examines lawyer-free English criminal procedure of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century transition to the adversarial criminal procedure that developed in 
the eighteenth century and the English civil procedure that was permeated with lawyers, 
evidence intensive, and passive.   
 
Evolution of the Criminal Trial  
English criminal procedure was, for centuries, organized around the principle that the 
accused should not be represented by counsel.  The whole process was, in fact, 
designed to be lawyer free.  In many cases the victim of the crime served as the 
prosecutors, or in cases of homicide either the victim’s family or the local coroner would 
stand in.  The form of altercation imagined in this trial procedure, as described by 
Langbein, is one in which the victim, acting as the prosecution, testifies under oath to 
his version of events.  The accused, speaking unsworn, replies to the accused 
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testimony, although not as a witness.60  At the conclusion of the altercation between the 
accuser and the accused, the trial judge, generally with little instruction, left the decision 
to the jurors.  Into the 1690s, criminal trials in England forbade the presence of defence 
counsel for serious crimes, including treason and felony.  Prosecution counsel was 
permitted in all cases, but generally was only employed for treason cases.   By the 
1790s, the criminal trial had undergone dramatic transformation, as counsel for the 
defence and prosecution had become primary characters.61  
The rule against defense counsel in felony trials was a matter of fact, rather than law.  
Initially developed around the “accused speaks” ethos where it was thought that the 
accused, if innocent, would clear himself through “the Simplicity and Innocence” of his 
responses.62  The courts of the eighteenth believed that denying defense counsel 
promoted truthful outcomes and avoided the artificial defences that would result in 
having others speak for the accused.  Criminal defendants were, in theory, permitted to 
engage counsel to make submissions of law at the pleadings or arraignment phases.  In 
general, pleading was about law and trials focused overwhelmingly on facts.63  The trial 
judge was often tasked with noticing legal flaws in criminal prosecution as so few 
defendants chose to engage counsel.   Coke suggested that this process was, in fact, 
superior to one in which the accused relied on counsel, stating that “it is far better for a 
prisoner to have a Judge’s opinion for him, than many counsellors at the Bar.  The 
Judges… have a special care of the indictment and to see that the same be good in all 
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respects; and that justice be done to the party.”64  The judge’s role as a sort of counsel 
for the accused was, however, problematic when one considers the judge’s other 
responsibilities, such as ruling on matters of law, probing suspect defensive evidence, 
advising the jury as to how to apply the law and summing up the evidence to the jury.   
Treason cases, however, saw much less assistance being offered to defendants by 
judges.  Langbein points to a number of reported treason cases of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries in which Judges were sometimes callous in their treatment of 
defendants.65  Judges, who held office at the pleasure of the crown, were faced with 
very partisan prosecutions.  When John Udall asked for assistance at his trial regarding 
his right to challenge jurors, the judge is said to have replied: “Nay, I am not to tell you 
that.  I sit to judge, and not to give you counsel.”66  By the end of the seventeenth 
century, the bias against defendants by the subservient bench in treason trials provoked 
palpable discomfort in the political classes.  For the most part, judges who presided 
over treason trials were handpicked for the particular trial.  Furthermore, the trials most 
often took place in London and under the close eye of the crown who had a direct 
interest in the outcome of the trial.67  The fear that judges could not be trusted to be 
impartial in treason cases was a precipitating factor in the movement to enact the 
Treason Trials Act of 1696, which allowed treason defendant to have the assistance of 
trial counsel.  This would be the first crack in the rule against defense counsel.68 
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The adversarial criminal trial procedure involving defense counsel was initially designed 
as a special-purpose procedure employed by the wealthy to defend against “trumped-up” 
charges of treason.69 In a relatively short amount of time, defence counsel became 
commonplace at trials.  As Langbein notes, the judges who initiated the process by 
admitting defense counsel into the felony trial did not intend to start a revolution, rather 
their plan was to allow defense counsel for the limited purpose of helping the accused 
examine and cross-examine witnesses.  The judges believed that by continuing to 
prevent defense counsel from stating the defendant’s case or interpreting the evidence 
to the jury, the “accused speaks” trial would be preserved.  Defense counsel, however, 
worked a structural change in the criminal trial by breaking up the two roles of defending 
and speaking the merits, both of which had previously been the responsibility of the 
accused.  Defense counsel articulated and enforced the prosecutorial burdens of 
production and proof and as a result largely silenced the accused.  As a result of these 
developments, the privilege against self-incrimination and the beyond-reasonable-doubt 
standard of proof were established.70  While the old altercation trial had been 
understood as an opportunity for the accused to speak in person to the charges and 
evidence against him, the adversarial criminal trial became an opportunity for defense 
counsel to test the prosecution.  The emergence of strict rules of evidence at this time, a 
development that I will address below, was likely a result of the pressure placed on the 
courts by the developing role of lawyers. 
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As a result of the shift away from the altercation trial where the accused and the victim 
were two of the central figures of the process, the function of the criminal trial also 
changed.  While the punitive and social order functions remained, that is, the accused, if 
found guilty continues to face consequences for his actions, the opportunity for the 
alleged victim to be involved in the process has been greatly diminished.  The result has 
limited the functions that criminal trial is able serve.  No longer is it an opportunity for the 
accused to speak to the community which they are alleged to have harmed.   
Due to their adversarial nature, criminal prosecutions did not always provide the best 
means to settle a dispute.  It was not long before it became evident that the criminal and 
civil trial format was not conducive to all areas of dispute resolution.  Administrative law 
and the tribunal system arose as an alternative to the juridified court system, offering 
flexible and less stringent procedures.71  Unlike courts, administrative bodies were 
intended to be able to formulate and apply alternative dispute resolution processes.  
The result of the juridification and the more limited functions of the criminal trial meant 
that inquiries were now one of the few institutions that could offer the community an 
opportunity to hear more information about an issue or event and have the opportunity 
to be involved.  Commissions, with their more flexible processes and procedures were 
able to provide an open forum for information to be presented and exchanged.   
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The “due process explosion” in administrative law  
Administrative processes thus offered themselves as a kind of alternative to the 
strictures of the criminal trial. Designed to be more flexible, accessible, expeditious and 
informal than court proceedings, the earliest adjudicative tribunals were given broad 
powers to conduct inquiries and were relieved from the obligations to follow the strict 
rules of evidence.72   In recent years, however, a similar process of juridification has 
also befallen that alternative system.  In 1971, a shift in administrative law occurred 
when Ontario introduced the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.  The Act provided for an 
adjudicative, adversarial form of hearing in the style of regular courts, though without all 
of the procedural requirements.  Instead, it employed processes more akin to standard 
administrative processes, including flexible rules of evidence, the concept of official 
notice and the ability to restrict representation by counsel.73  A result of 
recommendations from the McRuer Commission, a study of government law and 
institutions in Ontario, the Act applied to administrative tribunals that at the time would 
have been characterized as more adjudicative than administrative in nature.74  
Furthermore, applying the standard of natural justice and procedural fairness, judicial 
review urged administrative tribunal procedure back to the adversarial court-like 
model.75  
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  for	  Tribunals	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The “due process explosion” was not isolated to statutory developments and criminal 
law; administrative law has also undergone a dramatic shift towards greater procedural 
protections.  In 1979 the Supreme Court of Canada held that a probationary police 
constable was entitled at common law to procedural fairness before he was dismissed. 
In Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk (Regional Municipality) Commissioners of Police, the 
Supreme Court lowered the common law’s threshold for being able to assert a claim to 
procedural fairness, thus creating an easier process for making complaints about 
procedural fairness.  The impact of this decision rippled through a number of areas 
where procedural fairness claims on the basis of interest did not previously exist, 
including: immigrants seeking status in Canada,76 inmates77, parolees78 and those 
seeking tenure at universities.79   
 
The doctrine articulated in the 1979 Nicholson case implies a “right to present one’s 
point of view” when some interest is threatened.   Nicholson’s overall ambition was the 
recognition that common law hearing entitlements should be more broadly allocated.  It 
also suggested a concurrent acceptance that, within the new world of procedural 
fairness, a concept of “one model fits all” could not prevail and requirements of specific 
decision-making contexts must be reflected in a flexible approach to the scope of 
procedural rights.80  
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  Singh	  v.	  Canada	  (Minister	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  Cardinal	  v.	  Kent	  Institution,[1985]	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  S.C.R.	  643.	  	  
78	  Gough	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  Canada	  (National	  Parole	  Board)(1990),	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  Admin.	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  Admin.	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  (1983),	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Nicholson’s recognition of the need to adapt procedures, the process and the purpose 
of that process to the situation is at the foundation of administrative law.  The 
administrative tribunal system was designed as a more efficient and less technically 
complicated alternative to the traditional civil and criminal court system.  Unfortunately, 
it appears as though administrators are less willing to embrace this notion of flexibility.  
When the Board resumed its consideration of Nicholson’s status, despite being 
equipped with the discretion to proceed in writing, the Board afforded Nicholson an in-
person hearing at which he was entitled to be represented by counsel, to cross-examine 
witnesses and to present evidence.81 
More specific examples of the courts contribution to the “due process explosion” can be 
seen throughout a number of judicial review decisions.  In Napoli v. British Columbia 
(Workers' Compensation Board) the courts confirmed a requirement that all relevant 
adverse material was to be accessible.82  The Stinchcombe83 rules of full pre-trial 
discovery have been accepted or implemented by some courts and agencies where 
there is some similarity to the charging of a person with an offence.84  In Ontario, for 
example, the Human Rights Commission is obliged to follow these rules.85 The in-
person or oral hearing is increasingly becoming the norm whenever there are issues of 
credibility.  Additionally, the presence of lawyers along with the extent of their 
involvement has also increased.  As processes are becoming more complex, individuals 
are less confident in navigating administrative processes alone.   This despite the fact 	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  Commissioners	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(1983),	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  British	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  (1981),	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  D.L.R.	  (3d)	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  Stinchcombe,	  [1991]	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  326	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  David	  Mullan	  “Tribunals	  Imitating	  Courts	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  or	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  (Spring,	  2005)	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  J.	  1	  
85	  David	  Mullan	  “Tribunals	  Imitating	  Courts	  –	  Foolish	  Flattery	  or	  Sound	  Policy?”	  (Spring,	  2005)	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  L.	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that the Ontario Statutory Powers and Procedure Act and the Alberta Administrative 
Procedures Act, along with other similar legislation across the country, required 
administrative adjudications to provide reasons for the ultimate decision, a requirement 
confirmed by the Supreme Court confirmed in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship 
and Immigration).86   
Throughout the “due process explosion” discussed above the courts continued to 
suggest that the requirements of procedural fairness were flexible.   In Irvine, the court 
explained that the predominantly functional nature of procedural fairness and natural 
justice is underlined by the fact that they apply, depending on the circumstances.  
Specifically it noted that “fairness is a flexible concept and its content varies depending 
on the nature of the inquiry and the consequences for the individuals involved.”87  As far 
back as 1940 the American courts recognised that the origins and objectives of most 
administrative agencies should "preclude wholesale transportation of the rules of 
procedure, trial and review which have evolved from the history and experience of 
courts".88 
However, as evidenced by the examples above, despite the Court’s recognition of the 
flexibility of fairness the general trend in administrative law has been towards more 
regulated processes.  In the wake of Nicholson the tone of administrative adjudication 
changed.  Informality was less acceptable as many participants chose to be 
represented by counsel, and demanded stricter rules of disclosure and evidence, and 	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more formal oral or in-person hearings.  Lawyers, familiar with civil and criminal litigation, 
insisted on the adherence or, at least a reference, to those standards.89   
It would be inaccurate to suggest that all of these developments have had a negative 
impact on administrative law and/or procedural fairness.   Some changes, such as the 
duty to give reasons, were long overdue.  However, the degree to which many agencies 
and governments have adopted the courts prescription for procedural fairness has 
resulted in the foundation of administrative law, namely its flexibility, being eroded.  
Administrative bodies and tribunals are now in a position where they are either required 
or strongly encouraged to follow formal procedures, similar to those of courts, without 
the same support mechanisms and training.   
In recent years, there has been a growing recognition on the part of many administrative 
bodies as to the challenges facing those involved in administrative processes, in 
particular access to justice (cost, time, legal assistance) and power imbalances often 
evident at tribunal proceedings.  As a result, there has been a notable swing away from 
the adversarial models by many tribunals seeking a model that reduces the impact of 
these challenges.  The new model views tribunals as the adjudicative segment of a 
broader administrative process for implementing policy, the purpose of which is to 
achieve right decisions efficiently.  
Tribunals, in large part, are moving back toward less formality, more flexibility, 
facilitation of party participation, use of any special expertise effectively, and less delay 
through “active adjudication.” Essentially, as Ballagh points out, tribunals while 	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recognizing the procedural fairness requirements and Western tradition of adversarial 
procedures are looking towards a more inquisitorial model. 90  Furthermore, tribunals are 
increasingly rejecting the adversarial/inquisitorial dichotomy and instead seeking a “third 
way.”91 As Green and Sossin highlight, the “third way” or active adjudication is both non-
adversarial and non-inquisitorial, instead the goal is “problem-solving” and fulfilling the 
tribunal’s statutory mandate rather than “truth-seeking.”92  Tribunals across Canada 
have begun using a combination of adversarial and inquisitorial processes in part as a 
response to access to justice concerns and power imbalances in administrative 
proceedings.  Both tribunals and inquiries struggle with the balance between 
appropriate control of the proceedings and descending too deeply into the arena.  The 
courts have indicated that, in general, an adjudicator’s conduct will be determined on 
the traditional reasonable apprehension of bias test, specifically whether a decision 
maker appears to have either taken sides or prejudged facts, evidence or credibility.93 
A question is therefore raised as to what degree can public inquiries employ active 
adjudication when their mandate is most often focused on truth-seeking?  Inquiries are 
faced with many of the same challenges as administrative tribunals, however, exist for a 
different purpose. 
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Although many administrative bodies operate in relative obscurity, the nature of public 
inquires means that they are often subject to much greater public and media attention.94  
As a result of this public attention, inquiries are often subject to greater demands from 
participants for more juridified processes. Although their enabling statutes generally 
empower commissioners with a relatively large degree of flexibility over their practices 
and procedures, few inquiries have chosen to depart significantly from those employed 
in traditional criminal and civil trials. 
One of the more practical results is that the cost of calling an inquiry has escalated 
dramatically.  Mr. Justice Estey recalled that he has “seen the cost of an inquiry go from 
$60,000 for the Steel Inquiry, which including the printing of the report, to $1,400,000 for 
the Banking Inquiry.”95  Significantly, he noted that more than half of the cost in the 
Banking Inquiry was paid to lawyers.  Although some evolution of the inquiry process is 
inevitable, the transference or adoption of criminal and civil procedures is not the 
answer.  The escalating costs are preventing inquiries from being called, the formal 
processes are restricting who is able to participate and the increased presence of 
lawyers is shifting the focus of inquiries away from truth. 
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Key features of the juridification of Public inquiries 
From this story about the juridification of criminal and administrative law, one can 
extract three principal features or aspects: adversarialism and the rise of lawyers, the 
increased role of evidence, and a more passive role for the finder of fact.  These all map 
in interesting ways on the public inquiry and its process of juridification.  
Inquiries are often called in the wake of events that may have also been subject to 
criminal prosecutions or were considered for criminal prosecution.  Where the two 
overlap, the call for greater procedural safeguards during the inquiry process is most 
pronounced.  It is, however, important to remember that inquiries, no matter what the 
subject, are not substitutes for criminal trials. In prophetic words, the Ontario Court of 
Appeal warned “[a] public inquiry is not the means by which investigations are carried 
out with respect to the commission of particular crimes.” Inquiries are empowered with 
“coercive procedure” which is “quite incompatible with our notion of justice in the 
investigation of a particular crime and the determination of actual or probable criminal or 
civil responsibility.”96   However, as discussed above, the push towards greater 
procedural fairness and rules mimicking those of trials in administrative law has 
impacted on inquiries. We will see that they have been the engines of juridification in 
public inquiries.  
The possibility for collateral damage to an individual or organization’s reputation as 
inquiries carry out their mandate is real.   One often cited risk associated with inquiries 
is the negative impact inquiries may have on an individual’s reputation.  The Ontario 
Law Reform Commission commented on this risk in their 1992 report, stating: 	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Although critics have been ready to condemn the high cost of public inquiries, it 
bears emphasizing that the question whether such inquiries are worth the cost raises 
considerations beyond the merely financial. Increasingly, the question also involves 
a balance between the benefits of a public inquiry on the one hand, and, on the 
other hand, the costs associated with interfering with the privacy, reputation, and 
legal interests of individuals.97 
Inquiries have the power to compel individuals and organizations to produce any and all 
documents relevant to the matter under investigation; this has caused significant 
concern among inquiry participants.  This concern is often heightened by the fact that 
inquiries are often subject to significant and extensive media coverage.  Furthermore, 
inquiries often look like a trial insofar as they often take place in a courtroom full of 
lawyers and are presided over by a commissioner, who is often a former judge.  
Witnesses and participants in inquiries wary of this risk have increasingly relied on 
lawyers to protect themselves when appearing before or participating in an inquiry.   
The prevalence of lawyers at inquiries has become so entrenched that interested 
parties have chosen not to participate in circumstances where funding is not available.  
For example, the British Columbia Civil Rights Association withdrew from the Missing 
Women Commission of Inquiry when the B.C. government refused to provide funding 
for lawyers.  Michael Vonn, policy director for the BCCLA, stated that “it is simply 
impossible to participate in this inquiry without counsel.”98 
The increased presence of lawyers, as representatives for witnesses and interested 
parties, has had a dramatic effect on the procedures adopted by inquiries.  Lawyers, 
accustomed to the strict rules employed in both civil and criminal procedures, were 
quick to demand similar protections for their clients at inquiries. Lawyers pointed to the 	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sparingly utilized powers provided to commissions to make findings of misconduct and 
demanded that their clients be afforded a number of opportunities to defend against any 
allegations or potential allegations.   While these findings do not carry with them 
penalties such as fines or incarceration, they undeniably have the potential to cause 
significant harm to an individual’s reputation.  As a result, rights such as representation, 
notice of any potential allegations, the opportunity to respond to any allegations and a 
number of evidentiary restrictions have increasingly been incorporated in the practices 
and procedures of public inquiries.   
Conduct of Lawyers at Inquiries 
The cooperation of lawyers and parties of an inquiry is fundamental to the successful 
operation of a hearing.  Commission counsel is often the initial point of contact for both 
lawyers and parties and is looked to in order to establish a pattern of resolving 
procedural issues prior to hearings and an atmosphere and practice of fairness to 
witnesses.  The Commissioner of the Niagara Regional Police Force Inquiry felt so 
strongly about the adversarial tone set by some participants that he included a chapter 
in his report entitled “Why So Long? Problems and Frustrations of an Adversarial 
Inquiry.” The commissioner wrote: 
Most counsel were responsible and co-operative. Unfortunately there was a 
marked lack of co-operation and openness on the part of a small minority which 
greatly prolonged the Inquiry. This was displayed to a greater or lesser degree 
with almost every witness, almost every day, and on almost every subject.99 
The commissioner further explained the challenges he faced in the cross-examination 
techniques used by some counsel. 	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Witnesses were cross-examined endlessly, apparently in the hope that if counsel 
kept digging, something favourable to their client would eventually emerge. 
Attempts to limit cross-examination resulted in long arguments in justification of 
the questioning, with suggestions that limiting cross-examination would give the 
appearance of a cover-up. As a result, it was often necessary for Commission 
counsel to call several witnesses to prove a point where, in ordinary 
circumstances, one would have done.100 
More broadly, the commissioner noted that “[m]uch of the Inquiry was conducted by 
some of the parties on an adversarial basis, taking shots at each other in the arena of 
the Commission.”101  Commissioner Colter noted that the conduct could not “be 
explained simply on the basis that counsel responsible were more familiar with 
adversarial proceedings,”102 instead the commissioner viewed their actions as “a 
symptom of an underlying problem” which plagued the Niagara Police Force.  Although 
the commissioner noted other influences that affected counsel’s behaviour at the 
hearings, their familiarity with adversarial hearings appears to have had a negative 
impact   In both of his reports on the terms of reference for the Mulroney-Schreiber 
Inquiry, David Johnson refers to an concern expressed in the Rae Report that an inquiry 
not become “a circus of lawyers.”103   
The dominance of lawyers at inquiries is evident when in the sheer number of lawyers 
present in many hearing rooms.  At the start of the Phase 2 of the Braidwood 
Commission, 12 organizations and individuals chose to be represented by counsel.  At 
times this meant up to 20 lawyers being present in the hearing room.   Midway through 
the commission three individuals applied to be participants, increasing the number of 
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lawyers present.  Of these lawyers, approximately 10 - 12 represented the RCMP or 
Canadian Government in some capacity.   
In 1967, the court in Re Shulman confirmed the right to examine one’s own witness and 
to cross-examine the witnesses called by commission counsel and others.104  The court 
held: 
Cross-examination, wherever it is permitted, is not be a limited cross-examination 
but is to be cross-examination upon all matters relevant to eliciting the truth or 
accuracy of the allegations or statements made. Similarly, any person affected by 
allegations made before the learned Commissioner should be accorded the privilege 
of examination as a witness by his own counsel and should be subject to a right of 
cross-examination, not only by counsel for the Commission but by any person 
affected by the evidence of that witness.105 
Legislation governing public inquiries has permitted witnesses and those with interests 
closely tied to the issues related to the inquiry to be represented before the commission 
by counsel.  Like any lawyer acting on behalf of a client, counsel for inquiry participants 
attempt to ensure that their interests are not adversely affected.  While the importance 
of an individual’s right to counsel is not being questioned, the result of this right is often 
the presence of many lawyers in an inquiry hearing room all poised to cross-examine a 
witness.  The evidence adduced through cross-examination may not always be in the 
interest of the inquiry, which is to determine the facts of the matter at hand and develop 
recommendations.  Most often inquiries are established in order to determine what 
happened and develop recommendations in order to address any issues or faults that 
may be uncovered, they are not, in contrast to criminal trials, established to determine 
an individual or organization’s culpability.  As a result, any efforts by counsel to obscure 
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facts or information presented to an inquiry may impact the factual record upon which 
the inquiry will base its recommendations.  This, in turn, may mean that certain issues 
or faults are not adequately reflected in the factual record and the recommendations 
may fail to fully address the issues.     
Tactics are employed by lawyers in cross-examinations both in traditional trials and 
increasingly before inquiries are often in order to “win” the hearing room struggle.  
Winning often involves tactics that distort or supress the truth.106  
 
Findings of Misconduct 
Participants and their counsel will often point to the possibility of findings of misconduct 
in order to demand greater procedural protections and rights.   
The “section 13 process” derived from the section of the Federal Inquiry Act bearing that 
number involves the right to have notice of and to respond to an allegation of 
misconduct which the commission or commissioners may make in the report.  Although 
section 13 and its equivalents in provincial statues are written in relatively simple 
language, they have proven difficult to manage in practice.  Section 13 requires that no 
report shall be made against any persons until reasonable notice has been given to 
them of the alleged misconduct and they have been given an opportunity to be heard.   
One of the early cases examining section 13 was Laundreville v. R (No. 2), in which the 
Federal Court Trial Division examined the Rand Inquiry’s report delivered in August of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106	  Langbein,	  p.	  1	  
	   44	  
1966.  The publication of the Inquiry’s report ultimately led to the plaintiff’s resignation 
as a judge.  The allegations against Mr. Landreville related to his acquisition of shares 
in Northern Ontario Natural Gas at a time when he was the mayor of the City of Sudbury.  
An inquiry was established to examine issues of misconduct surrounding the acquisition 
of the shares in question.  Chief Justice Rand’s mandate was broad enough to 
encompass allegations of misconduct beyond the mere acquisition of shares, however, 
it was not specific in this connection.  In his report, Commissioner Rand found that Mr. 
Landreville was guilty of “serious misconduct” by reason of the manner in which he gave 
evidence as a witness in certain judicial proceedings arising out of the North Ontario 
Natural Gas affair.107  Collier J. found that the terms of reference of the Rand 
Commission were broad enough to encompass the findings of gross contempt, which 
the Commissioner had concluded flowed from Mr. Landreville’s evidence in the judicial 
proceedings, but he also concluded there was no allegation made, at any time, against 
him with respect to this specific conduct.  As such, Mr. Landreville was given no notice 
nor opportunity to respond as contemplated by section 13.   
The difficulty facing commissions of inquiry is finding the balance between fairness and 
procedural compliance with the requirements under section 13.  If reasonable notice is 
given during the inquiry, either by specifics in its terms of references or through 
allegations raised during the course of the course of the inquiry, does special notice 
need to be given under section 13?   Furthermore, if specific notice is required, when 
must it be delivered?  If notice is given just before the report is issued, the opportunity to 
be heard would be nothing more than an illusion.   	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Responding to the potential damage to the reputation of an individual involved in an 
inquiry and the importance of an individual’s reputation led the Supreme Court of 
Canada, in the Krever decision, to hold that a commissioner owes a duty of procedural 
fairness to individuals.108  The court was examining the actions of the Krever Inquiry.  
Following the conclusion of evidence at the inquiry, commission counsel invited all 
parties involved in the inquiry to make confidential, ex parte, submissions to commission 
counsel outlining the detailed findings of misconduct which the parties intended to 
submit to the commissioner.  Commission counsel, in turn reviewed the notices to 
determine whether to include such allegations in any section 13 notices that may be 
issued by the commissioner.  A large number of notices were subsequently issued to 
individuals and organizations, many of which resulted in judicial reviews seeking to 
quash the notices before the report was released.  The judicial review applications 
alleged the commissioner did not have the jurisdiction to form conclusions of law which 
related to potential civil or criminal liability; that delivering the notices at the end of the 
hearings violated procedural fairness; and that commission counsel should not 
participate in the preparation of the final report as they had assisted in preparing the 
notices and thereby had taken a position against the applications.109  The Supreme 
Court dismissed the judicial reviews, holding that the applications were premature and 
that it would only be in rare occasions that judicial review would result in preventing a 
report from being published.   
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The Supreme Court provided some guidance to commissions regarding their findings.  It 
held that commissions of inquiry may and often must make findings of fact, from which 
appropriate conclusions may be drawn as to whether there has been misconduct and 
who appears to be responsible for it.110  However, the court was careful to warn that any 
conclusions reached by a commissioner should not duplicate the wording defining a 
specific offence in the Criminal Code and furthermore that the same care should be 
taken to avoid making evaluations in terms that are used by courts to express findings 
of civil liability.  Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Cory stated: 
Findings of misconduct should not be the principal focus of this kind of public inquiry. 
Rather, they should be made only in those circumstances where they are required to 
carry out the mandate of the inquiry. A public inquiry was never intended to be used 
as a means of finding criminal or civil liability. No matter how carefully the inquiry 
hearings are conducted they cannot provide the evidentiary or procedural 
safeguards which prevail at a trial. Indeed, the very relaxation of the evidentiary 
rules which is so common to inquiries makes it readily apparent that findings of 
criminal or civil liability not only should not be made, they cannot be made.  
Lawyers, however, are often quick to note that the distinction between a commissioner’s 
findings of fact that give rise to “misconduct” and a conclusion that an individual has 
done or omitted to do something which is either criminal conduct or would give rise to 
civil liability is more apparent than real.  As a result, lawyers attempting to ensure their 
client’s reputation is not harmed by their involvement in a commission often employ 
adversarial techniques, such as intense cross-examination of witnesses and demanding 
more strict rules of evidence be employed.  
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The Role of Evidence at Inquiries 
As David Paciocco explains, few cases “ultimately turn on disagreements about the law 
and what it requires,” rather most “come down to disputes about facts.”111  Commissions 
of inquiries are, for the most part, called to determine what happened and are centred 
around facts.  Whether examining the causes leading to a mine collapse, water 
contamination, or the incongruence between estimated and actual salmon runs, facts 
are central to the work of inquiries.  The law of evidence determines what information, 
documents, and data can be considered by an adjudicator, how it can be proved and 
the use to which it can be put.   
Most Inquiries are not required by statute to follow the rules of procedure or evidence of 
criminal or civil trials.  Although their attention must often be directed to the past, 
ultimately their responsibility lies in focusing on the future to ensure any learned failures 
will never occur again.  The rules of evidence employed in civil, criminal and 
administrative tribunals are designed to ensure the trier of fact has access to evidence 
in order to determine liability, and are influenced by the fact that one party has the 
burden to demonstrate that liability.  These rules were, in part, developed as a result of 
the adversarial process, so as to protect the rights of the accused.  Inquiries, in which 
focus lies on facts in order to develop recommendations, are not required to adhere to 
the same strict admissibility requirements.  Inquiries do not have the same kind of 
balancing of liberties and interests that impel the law of evidence.  The law of evidence 
is not about determining facts but rather excluding facts.   	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Public inquiries are designed to be more inquisitorial than adversarial. Justice O’Connor, 
in his examination of public inquiries, warned of the risks that follow when inquiries 
begin to operate like trials: 
Unlike criminal or civil trials, inquiries do not need to be conducted within the 
confines of the fixed rules of practice and procedures. Inquiries are not trials: 
they are investigations. They do not result in the determination of rights or 
liabilities; they result in findings of fact and/or recommendations. Subject to what 
I say below about the need for procedural fairness for those who may be affected 
by the report of an inquiry, a commissioner has a very broad discretion to craft 
the rules and procedures necessary to carry out his or her mandate.112 
Inquiries, as noted by Justice O’Connor, are at their core investigations.  Called in the 
wake of a tragedy or significant public concern, the end result is not a determination of 
liability or rights, rather policy recommendations. As a result, the processes used to 
collect information and evidence need not follow the same strict evidentiary rules 
required in civil and criminal matters.  Recognizing this difference, Justice O’Connor 
continued: 
Traditionally, fact-finding inquiries have used public, evidentiary, court-like 
hearings to gather and test information. Commission counsel collects and review 
relevant documents, interview witnesses and then introduce the relevant 
information through sworn testimony in a court-like setting. Lawyers for parties 
with an interest in the inquiry are granted standing and are entitled to cross-
examine witnesses, and make closing arguments. 
These types of hearings can be very complex, time consuming and expensive. 
When public inquiries are criticized, criticisms are frequently directed at the 
inefficiency of the process, the time involved, and the expense incurred. Indeed, 
criticisms of this nature are sometimes used as arguments against holding an 
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inquiry in circumstances which otherwise warrant an independent examination 
and report.113 
The inefficiency of process described above by Justice O’Connor is, in large part, due to 
juridification influence over public inquiries. Attempts by commissions to adopt 
procedures designed for a very different end goal, specifically criminal or civil liability, 
has negatively impacted the conduct of inquiries.  Criminal trials are asked to examine 
one very specific incident or set of incidents.  Public inquiries, on the other hand, are 
often established to examine a much broader issue or set of issues.  The broad scope 
of many inquiries often requires a large amount of evidence to be considered by the 
Commission.  In criminal trials evidence is most often introduced through oral evidence.  
In public inquires, while oral evidence of witnesses is important, the number of 
witnesses that would be required to provide the Commission with the necessary facts is 
often unmanageable.  Even when the witness list can be limited to a reasonable number 
of witnesses, the number of participant counsel permitted to cross-examine witnesses 
has significant effects not only on the amount of time required for each witness but also 
the quality of evidence being produced.  The evidentiary rules are, thus, not particularly 
well suited for a process whose primary goal is fact-finding rather than the determination 
of liability. 
In the Erebus case, Lord Diplock described the contrast between civil litigation and an 
inquiry: 
Where facts are in dispute in civil litigation conducted under the common law system 
of procedure, the Judge has to decide where, on the balance of probabilities, he 	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thinks that the truth lies as between the evidence which the parties to the litigation 
have thought it to be in their respective interests to adduce before him.  He has no 
right to travel outside that evidence on an independent search on his own part for 
the truth…114 
In civil litigation, as described above, the judge generally plays a passive role with a 
focus on determining liability.  In inquiries, however, the commissioner is able to play a 
more direct role and as a result in less emphasis being placed on the rules of evidence.  
For example, in the Erebus Inquiry the commissioner was required to inquire into and 
report on the matter in question, in this case the cause of a crash sightseeing plane.  
His focus, therefore, was on acquiring as much information and drawing on as many 
facts as possible.  In doing so Lord Diplock stated: 
[I]t is inevitable, particularly if there are neither survivors or eye-witnesses of the 
crash, that the emergence of facts, and the realisation of what part, if any, they 
played in causing the disaster and of their relative importance, should be more 
elusive and less orderly, as one unanticipated piece of evidence suggests to the 
Commissioner, or to particular parties represented at the inquiry, some new line of 
investigation that it may be worth while to explore; where, whether in the result, the 
exploration when pursued leads only to a dead end or… The discovery of other facts 
which throw a fresh light on what actually happened and why it happened.115 
Depending on the particular finding and its importance, and notwithstanding that 
compliance with the strict rules of evidence is not required, cogent and reliable evidence 
may be required by the Commission before any findings are made.116  What findings 
require more formal evidence, however, is a determination that must be made by the 
Commissioner.  Most statutory schemes in Canada recognize that, at a minimum, the 
application of conventional evidentiary privileges represent protections that remain in 
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force.  For example, under section 9 of Alberta’s Public Inquiries Act, every person 
appearing before an inquiry has the same privileges as a witness in court.    
Finding the balance between procedural fairness and expediency falls to the 
commissioner.  However, Commissioners, who are most often current or former judges, 
who are surrounded by lawyers familiar with civil and criminal procedures often fall back 
on the procedures they are familiar with from civil and criminal trials, and the rules of 
evidence adopted by commissions are beginning to reflect this.   
 
The Commissioner recedes  
The impact of judicialization of administrative law on public inquiries is multi-faceted.  
The adoption of court-like procedures has meant that inquiries have shifted away from 
the original aim of policy development and fact-finding to one more concerned with rules 
of evidence, cross-examination times, and rights of participants and witnesses.  These 
trends are accompanied by a shift in the role of the commissioner.    
Commissioners derive their authority entirely from the Inquiries Act and the terms of 
reference established for each commission.  The Act and terms of reference define the 
jurisdiction of a commission and impose legal constraints as well as authority.  
Furthermore, commissioners are also legally constrained by the principle of fairness.   
As discussed in Part 1, the distinction between adversarial and inquisitorial proceedings 
is blurred in inquiries.  Judicial trials are conducted in an adversarial manner, where 
each side is responsible for assembling its own evidence, presenting it as favourably as 
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possible and for emphasizing the other side’s weaknesses. In these proceedings, 
judges play a passive role.  Commissioners are not legally required to play a passive 
role; rather inquiries have been described as inquisitorial processes that “require the 
commissioner to conduct an active search for the evidence.”117  Indeed, this is one of 
the virtues and possibilities inherent in the inquiries: the commissioner’s ability to take 
an active role in managing the direction of inquiry and the questions being asked.  The 
fact-finding and advisory aims of inquiries are not well suited to the adversarial process 
utilised in civil and criminal trials.  Rather, as Joan Dwyer noted “adversarial procedures 
for dealing with evidence may be unjust and render proceedings ineffective because 
they confuse and intimidate witnesses rather than assist a court or tribunal in 
determining the truth of that witness’ evidence.”118 
In civil and criminal proceedings judges are barred from conducting general 
investigations into related issues.  For example, in R v. Elliot119 due to the conduct of 
the judge a new trial was ordered by the Court of Appeal.  Justice Paul Cosgrove 
oversaw a trial where the accused was charged with murder and dismemberment of the 
dead body.  During the trial, the judge had allowed a number of defence motions that 
led to the transformation of the criminal trial into an investigation into the conduct of 
police and those involved in the prosecution.  Justice Cosgrove found misconduct on 
the part of over fifteen police officers, Crown counsel, officials of the attorney general’s 
office, solicitor general, immigration and the Ontario Centre of Forensic Sciences.  The 
findings included: witness tampering, non-disclosure, perjury, deceitful destruction and 	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fabrication of evidence, false and misleading submissions and other serious misconduct.  
The Court of Appeal found that there was no factual or legal founding for his 
conclusions and set aside his findings. 120   Commissioners of inquiries are equipped 
with much broader mandates and discretionary coercive powers and, as such, they are 
in a position to achieve actively certain ends not structurally available to judges. That 
said, Commissioners must also find the appropriate balance between investigative zeal 
and fairness to those involved.    
The Supreme Court noted the risks that face commissioners of inquiries, stating: 
Again, an interest in promoting a general cause may distort the judgment of even the 
most judicious person.  The danger of distorted perception is especially serious for 
those who obtain ego-gratification by feeling righteous after being perceived as such.  
Most public inquiries are about rooting something ever [one] thinks is bad, “drug-use 
in sports, political corruption, bad police behaviour” and a commissioner can be 
carried away with the general enthusiasm for reform to the point that individual 
conduct cannot be fairly evaluated.121   
It is possible that one expression of the effort to limit the possibility of the commissioner 
being carried away with his or her mandate has been to employ former or sitting judges 
to conduct inquiries.  As commissions of inquiry, like all legal processes, require public 
confidence, the person appointed, as commissioner must have some stature within the 
community.  Supported by guarantees of judicial tenure, financial security and 
administrative independence the office of a judge carries with it a degree of public 
confidence.  
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Legal qualifications and experience managing and conducting hearings are assets to 
commissioners of investigative inquiries.  However, hearings of a commission of inquiry 
require greater flexibility than those at a criminal trial and the commissioner must be 
willing and able to adapt procedural fairness to achieve expeditious hearings.   
The familiarity with traditional trials may not, however, always be an asset for 
commissioners.  For example, the commissioner of the Cornwall Inquiry, chose to move 
directly into court-like hearings for “contextual” testimony from eleven expert witnesses.  
In theory, this type of evidence could have been submitted to the inquiry through written 
reports.  Similarly, the evidence of nineteen corporate officials representing a number of 
public institutions could also have been received outside of the hearing room, especially 
as the inquiry’s terms of reference explicitly permitted the inquiry to reply on “factual 
overview reports.”  In contrast, the Goudge Inquiry took a very different approach to 
evidence.  Although governed by more systemic terms of reference, the Goudge 
Inquiry’s reliance on “overview reports” provided the Commission with the necessary 
evidence and allowed it to conclude its report within seventeen months.  
Commissioners, however, are caught in a difficult position.  In cases where they have 
attempted to regulate the hearing process more closely, for example by limiting cross-
examination, counsel have raised objections which in turn often lead to longer delays.  
Commissioner Corlter noted “attempts to limit cross-examination resulted in long 
arguments in justification of the questioning, with suggestions that limiting cross-
examination would give the appearance of a cover-up.”122  The reaction of counsel in 
situations such as this is reminiscent of those to judges in early English criminal trials.  	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As previously discussed, in the absence of lawyers, involved parties often looked to 
judges for legal assistance.  This assistance, however, became the basis for significant 
criticism, leading judges to play less and less of a role.  Commissioners of inquiries 
appear to be facing similar pressures from lawyers appearing before them and are often 
less involved in the hearing process.   
The social function of public inquiries turns, in many ways, on an active commissioner.  
The judicialization and the increased presence and reliance on lawyers, however, are 
placing greater and greater pressure on commissioners to take a more passive role.  
The result is, just like the process of the juridification found in the criminal trial, an 
erosion of the process initially designed as an alternative to the juridified criminal and 
civil trial. 
Based on this study of criminal and administrative law and the review of some dynamics 
in commissions of inquiry a number of juridification trends are evident; specifically, the 
trend towards increased reliance on lawyers and the greater presence of trial processes 
at inquiries.  The processes that juridified and features of juridification in criminal law 
have migrated and imposed themselves on public inquiries, though as I explained in 
Part 1, the purposes of the criminal trial and public inquiries are so different.  The 
benefits of public inquiries, namely the public education and participation portions are at 
risk if the patterns of juridification continue to occur. We now turn to examples of two 
recent inquiries to examine whether these patterns of juridification have occurred and if 
so, whether they have impeded on the realization of the goals and purposes of inquiries.   
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Recently administrative law has also witnessed a push back against juridification.  
Although adversarial model of adjudication has long been the gold standard in the 
Western world, it is not always a one-size-fits-all solution.  Administrative law has begun 
to recognize that the unique challenges it faces may require a deviation or modification 
from the classic adversarial process in order for the tribunal to make a fair and informed 
decision.123  Active adjudication has begun to take a more prevalent role in tribunal work 
along with a movement towards a more inquisitorial model.  Inquiries are often faced 
with similar pressures as though encountered by administrative tribunals such as 
unrepresented or lay-represented appellants or participants, limited budgets, and time 
constraints and in the future may also face similar pressures to rely more heavily on the 
flexibility of procedure permitted under their governing statute. 
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Part 3 - Case studies  
Different inquiries have adopted varying processes to meet the unique demands of their 
mandates while attempting to balance the juridification pressures.  Case studies 
demonstrate how frustration of the public purposes of inquiries can occur through 
juridification but also provide examples of methods of avoiding or mitigating these 
effects.  In Part 2 the pressure of juridification on public inquiries and administrative 
processes generally was examined.  Also noted was the recognition within the 
administrative law community that administrative processes are not always served best 
by adversarial procedures.  Courts have demonstrated their commitment to ensuring 
procedural fairness requirements are met while still permitting tribunals and inquiries 
flexibility in the creation of their procedures where the legislative intent was not to create 
an exclusively adversarial tribunal.124   
Below are two case studies that exhibit how commissioners have navigated the 
demands of flexibility and procedural fairness in their inquiries.  The first inquiry, the 
Walkerton Commission of Inquiry was governed by Ontario’s Public Inquiry Act and 
called in the wake of a tragedy in a small community in Ontario. The Missing Women 
Commission of Inquiry was similarly established under the provincial inquiries act but 
this time in British Columbia and called largely in response to community outcry 
regarding the investigation and response to the disappearance and murder of women 
who lived or frequented Vancouver’s downtown eastside.   
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These two inquiries were chosen as they exhibit many similarities in their structure, 
general subject matter, and size, however, despite their many similarities they had very 
different experiences. Both inquiries faced significant local and national media attention, 
required both fact-finding and policy development and dealt with procedural challenges.  
Additionally, both inquiries were tasked with both investigative and policy functions, 
involved many participants and witnesses, and attracted significant media attention.  
As will be discussed below, the Walkerton inquiry was able to engage and involve the 
community so as to gain their trust and respect.  The Commission made concerted 
efforts to reach out to the community in order to ensure a good degree of trust and 
participation.  Ten years later, the Missing Women Inquiry, on the other hand, faced 
many challenges in its attempts to secure the community’s participation and support.  
Constrained by both statutory requirements regarding methods of adducing evidence, 
budgetary and time limitations, and historical scepticism on the part of the community, 
the Missing Women Inquiry was criticised from almost every angle and faced nearly 
daily protests during the course of its hearing. 
The manner with which each commission addressed issues they faced and conducted 
their work provides interesting insight into possible options for resolving the tension 
between flexibility and conformity to traditional processes.   
The Walkerton Inquiry  
In May 2000 a small town in southern Ontario, Walkerton, experienced a devastating 
tragedy.  The city’s drinking water system became contaminated with a deadly bacteria 
resulting in the death of seven people and more than 2,3000 people becoming ill.  
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Following the tragedy the government of Ontario responded to the many pressing and 
important questions by calling an inquiry.  Specifically the Ontario government directed 
the Commission to inquire into the following: 
(a) the circumstances which caused hundreds of people in the Walkerton 
area to become ill, and several of them to die in May and June 2000, at or 
around the same time as Escherichia coli bacteria were found to be 
present in the town’s water supply;  
(b) the cause of these events including the effect, if any, of government 
policies, procedures and practices; and  
(c) any other relevant matters that the commission considers necessary to 
ensure the safety of Ontario’s drinking water,  
in order to make such findings and recommendations as the commission 
considers advisable to ensure the safety of the water supply system in Ontario.125 
The Commissioner, Justice Dennis O’Connor, chose to divide the inquiry into two parts.  
The first focused only on the events in Walkerton.  The terms of reference directed the 
Commission to inquire into the circumstances that caused the outbreak, including the 
effects, if any, of government policies, procedures and practices.  Part 2 went further 
and examined other matters the Commission considered necessary to ensure the future 
safety of Ontario’s drinking water.   
The Commission held Part 1 hearings in the town of Walkerton.  The Commission and 
its staff spent over 9 months in Walkerton conducting hearings, speaking with members 
of the community and hearing the stories and suffering endured by those who were 
affected.  In July 2000 the Commission convened four days of hearings in Walkerton 
and invited the members of the community to come and talk about the impact of the 
outbreak on their lives.  Over 50 presentations by individuals, groups and families were 	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made.  The Commission provided the presenters with the option of sharing their stories 
in public or in private.  The high value the Commission placed on the people of 
Walkerton and their experience cannot be overlooked.   
The Rules of Procedure and Practice were drafted by the Commission and based on 
the principles of thoroughness, expedition, openness to the public and fairness.126  The 
rules outlined the basis on which parties would be granted standing, their rights during 
the hearing, and the rights of witnesses. Parties were only permitted to comment on the 
rules once they had been granted standing. 
Over the course of the hearings the Commission entered 447 exhibits, containing more 
than 3,000 documents.  Over the course of a 9 month period 95 hearing days were 
conducted and 114 witnesses appeared.127   
The Walkerton Inquiry has often been cited as an example of a successful inquiry.  
Allan Manson and David Mullan concluded that “throughout the course of the Walkerton 
Inquiry and its immediate aftermath, there has been the general sense that this was a 
commission of inquiry that worked particularly well.”128   In their article, relied on a 
number of reasons to support this conclusion.  For example, the fact that there were not 
criticisms, by the public or participants, of the process and no legal challenges were 
raised in court.    
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Lawyers 
One of the key members of staff involved in a commission of inquiry is commission 
counsel.  Their primary responsibility is to represent the public interest at the inquiry.  It 
is their duty to ensure that all issues bearing on the public interest are brought to the 
Commissioner’s attention.  The role of commission counsel is neither adversarial nor 
partisan.     
Individuals and organisations granted standing in Part 1 of the inquiry were also 
afforded a number of procedural rights under the Public Inquiries Act and the Rules of 
Procedure and Practice.  This included the right to counsel.  Additionally, they were also 
granted:  
• Access to documents collected by the Commission 
• Advance notice of documents that were proposed to be introduced into 
evidence 
• Advance provision of witness statements prepared by the Commission 
• A place a counsel table 
• The opportunity to suggest witnesses to be called by Commission 
counsel or an opportunity to apply to the Commissioner to lead the 
evidence of a particular witness 
• The opportunity to cross-examine witnesses on matters relevant to the 
basis upon which standing was granted; and 
• The opportunity to make closing statements. 
 
Possibility of criminal charges 
Commissioner O’Connor’s mandate specifically provided that the Commission “shall 
ensure that it does not interfere with any ongoing criminal investigation.”129  The issues 
with the Walkerton water supply were widely reported before and during the 
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commission’s hearings and the on-going criminal investigation into the conduct of Stan 
Koebel was of keen interest to the media.   
As a result, when Mr. Koebel was called to give evidence, the question arose whether 
requiring his testimony at the Inquiry would adversely affect his right to a fair trial, if he 
were charged.  Mr. Koeble’s testimony was expected to be widely reported in the media 
and as a result the possibility of tainting pools of jurors across the province was also a 
real concern.  In response, Commission counsel notified counsel for both the Province 
of Ontario and Mr. Koebel that they could apply to the Commissioner for a publication 
ban on Mr. Koebel’s evidence.  However, in the end no application was made and the 
Commissioner was not required to make a decision whether a publication ban would be 
appropriate. 
In the final report, Justice O’Connor wrote about how an inquiry must respond to the 
concerns of the public.  Quoting Justice Cory, Justice O’Connor highlighted the 
importance of having an open hearing for the people of Walkerton. 
Open hearings function as a means of restoring the public confidence in the 
affected industry and in the regulations pertaining to it and their enforcement.  As 
well, it can serve as a type of healing therapy for a community shocked and 
angered by a tragedy.  I channel the natural desire to assign blame and exact 
retribution into a constructive exercise providing recommendations for reform and 
improvement.130 
Justice Cory’s words are especially relevant to inquiries, such as Walkerton and 
Cornwall (discussed below) where individuals involved also faced the possibility of 
criminal charges.  It highlights the role of inquiries being that of reform and improvement 
rather than blame and retribution. 	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The commissioner noted in his final report that counsel for the parties “performed 
splendidly.”131  While the commissioner noted that he considered imposing time limits 
on cross-examination, he chose not to.  He did, however, routinely ask counsel to 
provide estimates of time and generally held them to their estimates.  The 
Commissioner noted that “counsel for the parties kept their cross-examinations focused, 
thus avoiding considerable duplication and delay.  In an era in which criticism of the 
legal profession is common, it is heartening to be able to say that counsel in this inquiry 
performed splendidly.”132 
Evidence 
In order to obtain the evidence it required the Commission made 17 “detailed” document 
requests to various government ministries and departments over the course of 
approximately six months.  Prior to complying with the requests, the government 
requested that the Commission obtain search warrants from the Ontario Superior Court 
for each of the request.  The Commission and government agreed on the mechanism of 
a “friendly” search warrant as a means of accommodating the government’s concerns 
regarding privacy interests and third-party notification requirements under the Freedom 
of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, while ensuring that the Commission would 
receive the relevant documents.133   
Document production was conducted in waves and took place from August 2000 until 
approximately February 2001.  In his final report, however, the Commissioner noted that 
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production did not in fact end until after the conclusion of the scheduled Part 1 hearings, 
in November 2001.  Although the Commissioner recognizes that he would have 
preferred to have received certain document production earlier, he recognized that the 
process required substantial effort on the part of government staff and counsel.  
Document review was undertaken by Commission staff and required a special process 
be implemented to search and review the documents.  Hard copies of the documents 
were reviewed in order to identify groups of documents that should be electronically 
scanned into the Commission’s database form more detailed review.   
At the conclusion of the document production process the Commission obtained 
certifications of production from senior government personnel for each government 
ministry or agency that produced documents.  Recognizing that although Commission 
counsel and investigators were thorough in attempting to ensure that all relevant 
documents were obtained, the Inquiry was reliant on the word of the government that all 
documents were produced.  The certificates confirmed that all documents relevant to 
the subject matter of the inquiry were produced. 
Role of the Commissioner 
It has been suggested that one of the most distinguishing features of the Walkerton 
Inquiry was the Commissioner’s sensitivity to the Walkerton community.   Shortly after 
the Commissioner had assembled his team, they began meeting with representatives of 
local groups in Walkerton.  Within two months of the establishment of the commission 
four days of public meetings were held.  The public meetings were held in order to allow 
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the commission to hear directly from those who wished to tell their story about the on-
going impact of the tragedy on their lives.134   
Although the Commissioner conducted the inquiry with great sensitivity, it appears he 
held on to some of the formalities more common in the court system.  He declined any 
public comment except when presiding over the proceedings.  His silence extended 
long after the inquiry concluded, as he declined to comment on the Walkerton inquiry for 
Mullan and Manson’s article referred to above. 
The Walkerton Inquiry offers an insight into the efforts of a commission to mitigate the 
pressures of juridification.  Commissioner O’Connor was able to work within the 
legislative framework to ensure that he and his team had the necessary access to the 
community affected by the tragedy to hear directly from them about their experience in a 
less formal setting and also conduct hearings that respected and acknowledged more 
formal rules of evidence.  Commissioner O’Connor was able to achieve this balance, in 
part, due to the way Ontario’s public inquiry legislation is drafted.  The legislation does 
not separate the investigative and policy functions of inquiries.  The Missing Women 
Commission of Inquiry, conducted in BC under the relatively new Public Inquiry Act, on 
the other hand, had a very different experience.    
 
The Missing Women Commission of Inquiry 
The Missing Women Commission of Inquiry (MWCI) was established through an Order 
in Council issued by the government of British Columbia on September 27, 2010.  The 	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events leading to the MWCI were nothing short of shocking and horrific.  Since the early 
1990s, women had been reported missing from Vancouver’s downtown eastside.  Many 
of the women reported missing were part of the most marginalized groups of society – 
many were Aboriginal, many were sex trade workers and many were dealing with 
substance abuse issues and were particularly vulnerable to abuse and violence.   
Community groups and individuals raised their concerns and complaints regarding the 
women who were missing with the Vancouver Police Department.  The community’s 
fears of a serial killer were proven to be well founded when in 2002 Robert William 
Pickton was arrested and charged with 27 counts of first degree murder.  He was 
eventually tried and convicted of 6 counts of second degree murder and sentenced to 6 
terms of life imprisonment.  Evidence heard at Pickton’s trial suggests that he may have 
been responsible for the deaths of as many as 49 women. 
The Government of British Columbia set the following Terms of Reference for the 
Inquiry: 
Terms of Reference  
4(a) to conduct hearings, in or near the City of Vancouver, to inquire into 
and make findings of fact respecting the conduct of the missing women 
investigations; 
(b) consistent with the British Columbia (Attorney General) v. 
Davies, 2009 BCCA 337, to inquire into and make findings of fact 
respecting the decision of the Criminal Justice Branch on January 
27, 1998, to enter a stay of proceedings on charges against Robert 
William Pickton of attempted murder, assault with a weapon, forcible 
confinement and aggravated assault; 
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(c) to recommend changes considered necessary respecting the initiation 
and conduct of investigations in British Columbia of missing women and 
suspected multiple homicides; 
(d) to recommend changes considered necessary respecting homicide 
investigations in British Columbia by more than one investigating 
organization, including the co-ordination of those investigations; 
(e) to submit a final report to the Attorney General or before December 31, 
2011. 
The Order-in-Council defined missing women investigations as “the investigations 
conducted between January 23, 1997 and February 5, 2002 by police forces in British 
Columbia respecting women reported missing from the Downtown Eastside in the city of 
Vancouver.”  
The Commission, under the Terms of Reference, examined a broad range of issues: 
missing women investigations, the Crown’s decision to stay a proceeding, homicide 
investigations and coordination of investigations by more than one investigating 
organization.  The unique and broad range of issues led the inquiry to explore different 
approaches for community involvement.  While initially established as a hearing 
commission, in March 2011 the government approved the Commissioner’s request to 
extend the Commission’s powers by revising its mandate to include the powers of a 
study commission as well.   
However, unlike the support and acceptance experienced by the Walkerton inquiry, the 
MWCI was met with criticism and hostility.  Shortly after being appointed to head the 
Commission, Justice Wally Oppal, QC, a former Attorney General for the province and 
Court of Appeal judge, was be called on to recuse himself for comments he made to the 
media nearly a decade earlier.  Grand Chief Stewart Phillip, of the Union of B.C. Indian 
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Chiefs was especially harsh in his comments regarding the appointment, calling him a 
“Liberal Insider” and the “worst possible choice.”135     
These criticisms were only the beginning of the challenges the MWCI would face.  The 
inquiry was also subject to intense scrutiny when former employees alleged “they 
encountered a “highly sexualized” workplace environment where male staff members 
made offensive comments about women and their bodies.”136  An independent 
investigator was appointed and following a lengthy review, they were unable to find any 
evidence to corroborate the anonymous allegations.   
In the end, however, the Commission was able to complete its hearings, conduct a 
number of public policy forums and produce a four-volume report. 
 
Evidence 
MWCI faced an enormous task in its examination of an investigation that spanned 
nearly a decade.  The number of police officers, police agencies, witnesses, and 
experts involved in the investigations created a large body of evidence for the Inquiry to 
examine.  One of the primary reasons the Commission requested the extension of its 
mandate to include study powers was to enable it to consult with the communities in a 
less formal manner.  The study and hearing commissions ran parallel and utilised the 
same staff and resources.  Although very different in terms of their processes and 
procedures, both faced challenges regarding the collection and use of evidence. 	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Hearing Commission 
One of the most significant evidentiary issues facing the hearing commission was 
ensuring the confidentiality of the documents was maintained as appropriate.  However, 
the requirements of confidentiality had to be balanced with the Inquiry’s role of providing 
the public information.  So as to ensure that sensitive information was not released to 
the public, the Commission devised a system so that when exhibits were first entered 
they were marked as “NR” or non-redacted so that they could be vetted pursuant to 
various confidentiality protocols.  Once redactions were made, the NR was removed 
and the exhibit was posted to the Commission’s website.   
A number of formal evidentiary applications and rulings were made during the course of 
the Inquiry.  The first of these was an application for protective measures to enable and 
encourage vulnerable witnesses, including current or former sex-trade workers in the 
downtown eastside and victims of sexual assault, to provide evidence at the Inquiry’s 
evidentiary hearings.  The order requested: 
• An automatic publication ban preventing the publication of any information that 
could reveal the identity of a vulnerable witnesses; 
• Provisions allowing a witness to provide evidence by way of affidavit, without the 
possibility of cross-examination, with objections going to the weight of the 
evidence on balance of the whole.137 
The requested publication ban was analogous to s. 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code which 
provides a mandatory ban on publication of information tending to identify the 
complainants of sexual assault.  The Commissioner held that “nothing short of strong, 
clear proactive protection measures sought in this application will facilitate vulnerable 
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witnesses to provide their evidence to the Commission.”138 Commissioner Oppal, in 
granting the application, recognised the public interest in hearing from those persons 
who would otherwise be intimidated and distrustful of the system.  In utilizing the flexible 
procedures available to it, the Commission sought to strike the appropriate balance 
between ensuring protection and confidentiality of vulnerable witnesses and the rights of 
individuals who may be negatively impacted by the evidence of those witnesses. 
Study Commission 
The study Commission was established with the main objectives of: 
• Gathering information concerning current police initiatives and on-going 
challenges in the police protection of vulnerable women and suspected multiple 
homicides; and 
• Gathering input on potential recommendations on issues within the Commission 
mandate. 
 
The study commission relied on three means of obtaining information: consultations, 
publication of policy discussion reports to facilitate public submissions, and research 
and interviews. 
One of the challenges that faced the policy forums was the manner in which the 
evidence was to be dealt with.  Organizations and individuals who were unable to 
participate in the hearing commission due to lack of funding questioned whether the 
information acquired through the study format would be given the same attention and 
credence as evidence obtained through the hearing commission.  The study 
commission, unable to take evidence under oath, was seen by some as a secondary 
and inferior process. 	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Through consultations and research the Commission identified six themes that were to 
be addressed in policy forums.  Along with the in person policy forums, invitations to 
make written submissions were also sent out and encouraged.  In total, sixteen reports 
were prepared and published on the Commission’s website.  These reports were 
created in order to encourage and facilitate dialogue with experts and the community.  
In addition to the reports, the commission also prepared a number of question and 
answer videos with Dr. Melina Buckley, policy counsel for the Commission, to discuss 
the issues that were to be addressed at the forums.   
Although the information obtained at the policy forums could not be considered 
“evidence” like that obtained through the hearing commission, and thus could not be 
relied on for the fact finding portion, the Commissioner noted in his final report that “the 
study commission process made a substantial contribution to my ability to carry out 
paragraphs 4c and 4d of my terms of reference.”139 
 
Lawyers 
One of the most significant obstacles facing the MWCI was the provincial government’s 
decision to deny the funding requests and recommendations made by the 
Commissioner.  Fourteen groups withdrew from the MWCI following the government’s 
decision not to accept the Commissioner’s recommendation that lawyers for those 
groups receive funding.  The funding would have gone towards lawyers to enable them 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139	  British	  Columbia.	  Missing	  Women	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry.	  &	  Oppal,	  W.	  T.	  (2012).	  Forsaken:	  The	  report	  of	  the	  
Missing	  Women	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry.	  Vancouver:	  Missing	  Women	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry,	  Part	  4,	  p.	  26.	  
(Forsaken)	  
	   72	  
to cross-examine witnesses and make submissions to the commissions.   Unfortunately, 
most of the groups that did not receive funding were those representing the interests of 
members of the downtown eastside community and civil rights organizations such as 
Amnesty International and the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association.  
Speaking to the press shortly after the decision not to provide funding was released, 
Alex Neve, secretary general of Amnesty International Canada, said his group had been 
calling on governments to establish a public inquiry for years and deeply regretted not 
being able to participate.  He noted that Amnesty International had never pulled out of 
an inquiry before, however, it felt that “the inequity had effectively derailed the 
process.”140  Michael Vonn, speaking for BCCLA, noted that the imbalance of numbers 
was clear.  Following the government’s decision not to provide funding to a number of 
organizations, 14 groups withdrew from the commission.  At that time, the various state 
and police actors were set to have 14 lawyers to defend their interests before the inquiry.   
Commissioner Oppal, recognizing the need to have community and aboriginal interests 
represented at the inquiry, appointed two independent counsel to act on behalf of the 
downtown eastside community and aboriginal women’s interests respectively.141  
Although this move was not embraced by all, it was seen as an attempt by the 
Commission to ensure that despite the government’s decision to deny funding to 
participants, the interests and understanding of those communities were presented at 
the inquiry.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140	  Neal	  Hall,	  “BCCLA	  and	  Amnesty	  International	  join	  growing	  list	  of	  groups	  boycotting	  Missing	  Women	  inquiry”	  
Vancouver	  Sun,	  October	  6,	  2011.	  
141	  Press	  Release,	  August	  10,	  2011	  –	  Missing	  Women	  Commission	  Appoints	  Two	  Independent	  Lawyers;	  Two	  Others	  
to	  Participate	  Pro	  Bono,	  missingwomeninquiry.ca	  
	   73	  
The tendency towards adversarial advocacy was also evident at the Inquiry.  On several 
occasions the lawyer representing the families of a number of missing and murdered 
women exchanged heated comments with the Commissioner.   For example, following 
the cross-examination of a witness, a misunderstanding regarding the evidence resulted 
in negative statements being made regarding that witness.  Following a clarifying 
statement being made by a lawyer for the witness, Commissioner Oppal challenged the 
lawyer whose questions led to the misunderstanding and his cross-examination style in 
general: 
You're cross-examining a witness and you should know the answer that you're 
going to get in cross-examination and it was left hanging. That's all I'm saying to 
you. All I'm saying is that I want fairness in cross-examination. We treat people 
with fairness when they come into a courtroom and those things have to be 
asked in a proper way so incorrect impressions aren't left after the witness leaves. 
Similarly in that vein, I don't interrupt cross-examination, as I said, I trust the 
lawyers. You asked Catherine Astin, the nurse, what the value of her home is. 
Can you tell me what the relevance of that is? Again, I left you alone and I left 
here scratching my head, wondering why it was relevant for this commission of 
inquiry to hear whether Catherine Astin lives in a two million dollar home. What 
was the purpose of that? 
MR. WARD: Again, you're drawing my attention back to events that occurred 
sometime ago, but my recollection on that -- and I'm content to face any 
interrogation about my conduct --142 
In the final report, the Commissioner once again had strong words for Mr Ward.  On a 
number of occasions throughout the course of the inquiry Mr Ward had suggested that 
the police departments were involved in a “cover up” regarding the investigation into the 
missing and murdered women.  In response to those allegations, the Commissioner 
stated: 
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I conclude that these allegations are completely unsupported and 
unsubstantiated by any evidence and there is no air of reality to them, even as a 
theory. I am not even clear on what theory Mr. Ward is purporting to advance. I 
am sympathetic with the VPD’s submissions that Mr. Ward’s position is ludicrous, 
flippant, unsupported by evidence and unprofessional. His comments are 
reckless. I do not entertain highly speculative and harmful allegations that are 
unsupported by evidence or a rational theory.143 
The impact of Commissioner Oppal’s words led to a reaction from many, including the 
BCCLA.  BCCLA raised concerns that the comments made in the report could “chill 
public interest lawyers from asking difficult questions during future public inquiries.”144  
BCCLA further noted that the lawyer in question was one of only four lawyers working 
on behalf of non-police and non-government groups, facing, at times, more than twenty 
police and government lawyers.   
Role of the Commissioner 
Commissioner Oppal faced intense media pressure and scrutiny throughout the inquiry.  
His appointment was considered controversial and several organizations and 
community members called for his resignation or for the appointment to be rescinded.145   
Throughout the course of the inquiry, Commissioner Oppal was plagued with a number 
of other controversies.  In May 2011, the media reported that Commissioner Oppal had 
taken a role as a gunshot victim in a film about a serial killer.  Commissioner Oppal 
defended his choice to participate in the movie as being a person choice carried on in 
his own time.146   Commissioner Oppal was also forced to defend himself again 	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following a “casual” encounter and conversation with a Hells Angel motorcycle club 
member.   
Unlike other Commissioners who chose to avoid interaction with the media during the 
course of the inquiry, Commissioner Oppal often spoke directly with the media 
regarding the inquiry and on topics more broadly associated with law and society.  The 
Commissioner’s openness with the media was never challenged by counsel and no 
formal claims of bias were ever made.   
Controversy and conflict were also present within the hearing room.  As previously 
mentioned, on a number of occasions the Commissioner and some of the lawyers 
appearing before the inquiry were involved in heated exchanges.  In an attempt to 
control the hearings time and process the Commissioner imposed time limits on cross-
examinations and would interrupt counsel if they exceeded their time.  Furthermore, the 
Commissioner’s decision to call witnesses as part of a panel, rather than individually, 
caused some controversy within the hearing room.  In Procedural Directive #3 the 
Commissioner stated that: 
We have spent much time and learned a lot about what went wrong and it is now 
time to focus more actively on any investigative failures and how they can be 
prevented in the future. Therefore, in addition to the more traditional evidentiary 
hearings that are underway, we will be introducing a more cooperative approach 
to allow us to pursue this aspect of the mandate. 
It is for these reasons that I set out additional steps that the Commission will be 
taking in this Process Management Directive. To achieve this I am implementing 
several strategic approaches to obtaining further information. All of these 
approaches have a common purpose: working collaboratively with communities, 
police agencies, governments and women at risk to develop new strategies to 
protect women at risk. I am asking for help from all those affected, including 
victims’ families, community members and leaders, First Nations community 
members and leaders, political leaders, police and policing institutions. 
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Accordingly, one approach will be to receive information from groups of 
witnesses which will be constituted as “panels”…147 
The Directive went on to explain that the purpose of the panels would be to inform the 
development of recommendations in three core categories: the difficult interface 
between the policing authorities and the marginalized community of these victims; inter-
jurisdictional difficulties between different police forces; and shortcomings in 
organizational systems.148  The Commissioner was of the belief that the panel format 
would enable the Commission to develop the information in an effective and efficient 
manner.  The Commissioner’s directive was met with mixed reactions.  Although some 
counsel argued that the format impeded their ability to effectively cross-examine 
witnesses,149 others were more open and willing to work with the new process.150 
The MWCI is an example of an inquiry that faced numerous and unprecedented 
pressures and challenges.  Governed by a legislative framework that restricted the 
commission’s flexibility in relation to the collection, analysis and use of evidence, the 
commission was unable to gain the complete support to the community.  Although the 
commission attempted to work around the juridified processes codified in the legislation, 
the community was not willing to accept the two processes as being equal.  Although 
the MWCI faced many challenges and it cannot be argued that greater community 
participation would have benefited the commissions understanding of the issues before 
them, the final report was thorough. 
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Part 4 – Downsides of the Push towards Formality 
In the previous part, the increased reliance on the adversarial hearing model was 
discussed, however, it was also clear that it would be inaccurate to characterize a 
hearing conducted by a commission of inquiry as a purely adversarial process, as the 
boundary between the administrative fact-finding nature of inquiries and their public 
policy goal is often blurred.  However, the inquisitorial nature of inquiries places them at 
odds with the adversarial system of criminal justice in Canada.151    The difference has, 
as previously discussed, led to a judicialization and, as a result, adversarialization of the 
inquiry process so as to bring them more in line with criminal and civil proceedings.  
Over judicialization of inquiries, however, may destroy the flexibility necessary for a 
commission to complete its mandate.   
Historically, the adversarialization of judicial processes is evident through examples 
such as the criminal trial.  Although this change occurred several hundred years ago, 
the legacy and continued pressure of judicialization remains and has been evident in 
administrative law processes for some time.  More specifically, inquiries have recently 
been subject to significant pressures to adopt practices and procedures common in 
criminal and civil trials.  This part will discuss the manner in which judicialization and 
adversarialization of inquiries damages their ability to achieve the purposes for which 
they were created.  For example, tactics commonly used by lawyers in civil and criminal 
trials have the potential to impact efforts by an inquiry to determine facts.    Furthermore, 
I will suggest that the pressure to judicialized inquiries is a problem and has had a 
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negative impact on the ability of inquiries to fulfil several of their intended purposes 
including public participation and education.  The two case studies discussed in part 3 
demonstrate the challenges that face inquiries that are tasked with investigating a 
tragedy that was deeply felt by their respective communities while also gathering 
sufficient information and research to develop meaningful and appropriate 
recommendations.  The inquiries faced similar and significant challenges, however, due 
to a number of factors experienced very different outcomes. 
 
Impact of Adversarial Pressures on Inquiries 
Inquiries, as demonstrated, have been placed in a precarious position given their 
historic purposes and design on the one hand and the pressures for juridification and 
alignment with criminal and civil trial processes on the other.   Fidelity to the purposes is 
key should inquiries maintain their useful position in Canadian society.  As will be 
discussed below, inquiries were not designed to follow an adversarial process.  
Although they have adapted and made allowances for certain procedural rights, by 
design, the focus of inquiries should be on fact-finding, public education, and the 
development of policy recommendations.  
Although public inquiries often arise as a result of tragic or shocking events and many 
are looking for a place to lay blame inquiries were designed as a means to determine 
facts and formulate recommendations for future policy, not determine culpability.  
Although they have often utilized the adversarial trial model to determine facts, the Acts 
governing the inquiry process provide inquiries with a great deal of flexibility in their 
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process so as to allow for the fact finding and recommendation development process to 
occur.   Criminal and civil actions are often also commenced following events that lead 
to the calling of an inquiry; it is in those courtrooms under the more strict rules of 
evidence and procedure that culpability should be determined.   
It would be unreasonable and unnecessary to insist that commissions of inquiries 
proceed under the same rules of evidence and procedure as criminal and civil trials, as 
it would render them prohibitively time consuming and expensive.  However, as 
previously mentioned, the threat of damage to reputation of individuals and 
organizations involved has led to pressure on inquiries be sensitive of the potential 
damage.  Critics have argued that in instances where the Commissioner intends to 
make a finding of misconduct against and individual, the commission should base 
findings only on evidence that would ordinarily be admissible in a court of law.152  These 
rules have served a useful purpose in protecting the rights of individuals who are 
prosecuted for criminal offences or sued in civil actions.   
For example, following the E. coli outbreak in Walkerton, there were a number of 
lawsuits filed.  In May 2000, a class action lawsuit was commenced on behalf of the 
people of Walkerton affected by the E. coli contamination.  The class action included 
compensation for death, illness, property damage, economic loss, diminution in property 
values and the inconvenience of being without water for several months.   The events 
surrounding the Westray mine disaster led to criminal charges being filed against    
two mine managers.   	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As Mr. Justice Estey wrote 
The inquiry process is, of course, straightforward.  The difficulty at the outset, 
which continues throughout, is to discharge your mandate without becoming an 
inquisition, without becoming unduly inquisitorial and without maligning the 
witnesses and behaving like a New York district attorney on the television.153 
Inquiries were established as a means for government to obtain information and receive 
recommendations on a discrete issue or incident.   In 1979 the courts analysed the 
specific nature of commissions of inquiry within the machinery of government.  
Examining the McDonald Inquiry, established to examine certain activities of the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the court held that the appointment is the creation of 
“an organism of the Executive branch of government.”154  The court noted that even 
though it conducts hearings, it is not a branch of the judiciary and rather it “fulfils 
Executive or administrative functions.” 
Ratushny concludes that commissions of inquiry may best be described as a “residual 
institution” as it they are invoked as a remaining alternative when other institutions or 
processes are inadequate.155  These other intuitions, including criminal and civil trials, 
lack the unique combination of powers and processes available to inquiries.  The fact 
finding, analysis and recommendations that often result form inquiries may bring 
reassurance and closure to individuals or communities affected by the incident or issue.     
Following the inquiry, Justice O’Connor commented further on the use of civil and 
criminal evidentiary rules by inquiries: 
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…[t]hat inquiries have, in my view, tended to overuse the evidentiary, adversarial 
type of hearing process suited for legal trials to gather information. I think that we 
have yet to take full advantage of all of the possibilities for different processes 
that can be tailored to meet the need of investigating and reporting on the various 
types of matters set out in inquiry mandates. I believe that greater creativity and 
flexibility in fact‐determining processes will ultimately improve the inquiry process 
from the perspective of all participants, increasing responsiveness, decreasing 
cost, and ultimately improving the process and results of public inquiries. In my 
view, there is a real advantage to directly involving groups and individuals in the 
inquiry process, rather than having them participate only through lawyers. This is 
particularly the case where the participants have experience, expertise and an 
understanding of issues under consideration. From a cost perspective, 
minimizing the involvement of legal counsel, when not necessary, can result in a 
significant cost reduction.156 
Justice O’Connor’s comments highlight the importance of inquiries maintaining flexibility 
in their procedures and ensuring that hearings do not simply evolve into alternative 
courtrooms.  Inquiries were designed to determine facts and develop recommendations, 
while procedural fairness, especially in instances where an individual’s reputation may 
be at risk, must be respected, so too must the goals and purposes of inquiries.   
The presence of counsel at hearing commissions has, for better or worse, become the 
norm.  Although not required by statue, the majority of participants involved in inquiries 
choose to be represented by counsel in the hearing room.  If, as previously argued, 
public inquiries are intended in part to provide greater public access to government in a 
society where access is largely filtered through the language and habits of judges and 
lawyers,157 further judicialization the inquiry process only furthers to widen the 
undermine the public purpose of inquiries.  The presence of lawyers has become so 
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156	  Hon.	  Associate	  Chief	  Justice	  Dennis	  R.	  O’Connor,	  “Some	  Observations	  on	  Public	  Inquiries,”	  (Canadian	  
Institute	  for	  the	  Administration	  of	  Justice	  Annual	  Conference,	  delivered	  at	  Halifax,	  10	  October	  2007),	  
online:	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  for	  Ontario	  <http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/coa/en/ps/speeches/publicinquiries.htm>.	  
157	  Sossin,	  Lorne	  Mitchell,	  and	  Colleen	  M	  Flood.	  Administrative	  Law	  in	  Context.	  2nd	  ed.	  Toronto:	  Emond	  
Montgomery	  Publications,	  2013,	  p.	  574	  
	   82	  
inquiries rather than represent themselves.158   Michael Vonn, policy director of the 
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, stated “it is simply an impossibility to 
participate in this inquiry without counsel.”159  Others argued that not funding lawyers for 
all groups meant that it was “not a level playing field.”160     
In his recommendation to the provincial government, Commissioner Oppal held that the 
13 participant groups would be in an “unfair position” if they were not granted funding.  
Following the government’s decision not to provide funding, the Commissioner, in an 
unprecedented move, asked the government to reconsider.  The government, however, 
chose to maintain its position, stating that 
Wally Oppal’s commission is providing very valuable information about the past 
and how we can make sure that the VPD and other areas of law enforcement in 
the Lower Mainland have closed the gaps that allowed the tragedy to unfold on 
the streets of downtown Vancouver.  If we can find millions of dollars to spend – 
and we should – it needs to be about going forward and making sure women 
today are protected.161  
It was not only the groups seeking to participate in the inquiry that recognized the 
inequality of unrepresented parties at inquires.  The MWCI, in an attempt to ensure that 
all relevant voices were heard at the inquiry chose to appoint two independent lawyers 
to act on behalf of community and aboriginal women’s interests.  The addition of the two 
independent lawyers demonstrates the impact judicialization has had on inquiries.  
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Commissioners are recognizing that individuals and organizations may not be capable 
of navigating the inquiry process without the assistance of counsel.   
The issue of inequality between parties is not one isolated to represented and non-
represented participants at an inquiry.  In his review of the American adversarial system, 
Keith Findley was critical of the adversarial process.  Although Findley’s concern was 
directed more at the relative skill and experience of lawyers at trial, his comments are 
also relevant to inquiries where participants are not required to represented by lawyers. 
The current American system is marked by an adversary process so 
compromised by imbalance between parties – in terms of resources and access 
to evidence – that true adversary testing is virtually impossible.  It is a system in 
which competing litigants, unequal as they are, control everything from the 
investigation to presentation of the evidence, and in which their motivation in that 
process is to win, more than to discover the truth.162 
Although commissions of inquiry are not purely adversarial processes, given the recent 
trend of inquiries to conduct hearings where evidence is often tested through cross-
examination by multiple lawyers, it is often difficult to distinguish the hearings from a 
traditional adversarial trial.  Mr. Findley’s view that litigants are so motivated by the 
interests of their clients that they will coach witnesses, suppress facts, employ tricks and 
surprises, distort the truth, and manipulate fact finders.163  The concerns raised by Mr. 
Findley are in relation to the issue of high rate of wrongful convictions; the tactics 
described above would have a significant impact on an inquiry’s efforts to determine the 
facts required by its mandate.  
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Leaving adversarialism at the door – Study Commissions  
Issues or events being examined by inquiries will often involve many individuals and 
organizations all with different interests, views, questions and goals.  Parties wishing to 
participate in an inquiry must fulfil certain criteria in order to be granted participant 
status.  While their interests and goals may differ, rarely can all participants be 
considered adversaries in the same way as parties to criminal and civil trials as the 
focus of public inquiries is on fact finding and/or policy development, not culpability.   
At inquiries where the primary focus is on policy research and development the issue of 
adversarialism is diminished. However, inquiries where both hearing and study portions 
study commissions may be viewed as “secondary” processes.  Inquiries, or study 
commissions, whose mandate focuses on policy research and development may 
choose to adopt processes such as literature reviews, interviews or forums.  The issue 
of adversarialism, generally, does not come into play.  However, on occasions where 
inquiries involve both hearing and study components, the adversarial tone may be 
transferred from the hearing to study activities.  
The Missing Women Commission of Inquiry, for example, was designated both a study 
and hearing inquiry to inquire into and make recommendations regarding police 
investigations into missing women.   The legislation governing public inquiries in British 
Columbia prevents the study commission from conducting hearings where evidence is 
taken under oath.  Instead, study commissions are granted a wide range of powers to 
research and examine areas within their mandate.  Public meetings may be conducted 
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and submissions, both oral and written are permitted, however, commissions “must not 
exercise the powers of a hearing commission.”164   The MWCI study commission was 
designed as a forum to encourage and engage in a dialogue about issues surrounding 
the commission’s mandate.  Participants, community organizations, and the public were 
invited to participate through written submissions, comments on study papers released 
by the commission and attendance at policy forums.  It was hoped by the commission 
that those organizations who were unable to participate in the hearing inquiry due to 
lack of funding for counsel, would be able to participate as there would be no cross-
examination or review of evidence required to participate in the forums.  In a lengthy 
letter addressed to the commission, 17 organizations who, although previously granted 
participant status, had withdrawn from the inquiry, wrote to express their disappointment 
in the commission process and their intention not to participate in the study commission 
or policy forums.  The organizations stated that they had 
no confidence that the insight or expertise we could now offer would make any 
difference to the Inquiry’s outcome or the strength of its recommendations. The 
government’s failure to commit the necessary resources to this Commission does 
not bode well for its commitment to implementing any of the Commission’s 
recommendations, and the Commission’s continued exclusion and 
marginalization of community voices undermines the credibility of the entire 
process. We see little value in spending our organizations’ extremely limited time 
and resources contributing to a process that is fundamentally flawed and 
irredeemably defective.165 
Individual letters accompanying the open joint letter also noted that the policy forums 
were viewed as ‘secondary” and concerns about the weight that would be attached to 
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submissions made at the policy forums were raised.166  In a letter to the Commission 
Native Women’s Association of Canada, in reference to their invitation to participate in 
the study commission, NWAC stated “aboriginal women, and their organizations, should 
not be relegated to a secondary forum.”    
The community organization’s choice not to participate in the study commission was 
recognized by the commissioner in his final report 
The greatest challenge we faced with respect to the study commission process 
was undoubtedly the boycott by individuals and organizations representing two of 
the most affected communities, the DTES and Aboriginal communities.167 
The community groups’ choice to boycott the study portion of the Commission and the 
Commission’s recognition of the impact of that decision suggests that the effects of 
judicialization of inquiries has impacted their ability to perform the social function.  
Unable to engage organizations involved in the issues being examined or gain support 
a Commission’s ability to foster a dialogue and democratic participation is greatly limited.  
Processes that engage communities in expressing truths and remove any notions of 
liabilities, namely truth and reconciliation commissions, have been turned to alternatives 
to public inquiries in some instances.  Although they provide for the public education 
and engagement in addition to fostering healing within the community, it must be noted 
that their function and purpose is limited.  
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Truth and Reconciliation Commissions as an Alternative to Public Inquiries 
The judicialization of inquiries has the potential of undermining the original merits 
imagined for inquires by reducing their ability to be flexible and adapt to challenges and 
meet its mandate.  Justice O’Connor, in his observations on public inquiries noted that 
there are alternatives to “full blow evidentiary hearings” for some parts of the information 
gathering process.  He stated that 
Tied to the idea that a commissioner can adopt a more informal, less evidentiary 
type process for some parts of the investigation and some issues is the notion 
that not all parts of the investigative process need to take place in public.  The 
preparation of investigative summaries, detailed chronologies and background 
papers can be thoroughly and effectively done by commission staff and experts 
outside the public hearing process.168 
Traditionally the mechanism used to address deep societal problems in Canada is 
public inquiries, however, recently, following examples set in Africa and Australasia, 
Canada has a adopted an alternative process, the truth and reconciliation commission.  
The impact of judicialization has drawn away from the original purposes of public 
inquiries, primarily in relation to public participation.  Do truth and reconciliation 
commissions, unlike public inquiries, represent a means of meeting the social 
engagement and education functions of public inquiries that has been eroded by 
judicialization? 
Truth and reconciliation commissions represent an alternative means of obtaining facts, 
engaging in dialogue and encouraging healing.  Removing adversarial and judicial 
procedures, a TRC’s mandate tends to focus on acknowledgment of events and actions, 
promoting awareness, establishing a historical record and commemorating victims.  A 	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number of different models for truth and reconciliation commissions exist, therefore, like 
public inquiries, it is difficult to provide a definitive definition.  Many TRCs share several 
core elements including: (1) establishing the legitimacy of the commission through 
consultation with the public; (2) articulating a properly tailored mandate; (3) selecting 
neutral and respected personnel; (4) providing for adequate resources and funding; (5) 
delineating specific activities and powers to enable the commission to fulfil its objective; 
and (6) producing a final report with concrete and manageable recommendations.169 
Often included in a TRCs mandate is the establishment of a record of past abuses.  It 
has been suggested by proponents of TRCs that creating such a record may help in 
holding perpetrators accountable while simultaneously providing a forum for victims to 
recount the abuses they suffered.170  Following the failure of legal mechanisms 
including criminal prosecutions, civil litigation and alternative dispute-resolution 
programs to address the legacy of Indian Residential Schools (IRS), the government 
established the a truth and reconciliation commission.  The Indian Residential Schools 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission established by the Canadian government 
expressly prohibited formal legal processes like those used in public inquiries.  No 
findings of misconduct could be made, the Commission did not have power to compel 
testimony and participation was voluntary.   Furthermore, the Commissioners were 
required to: 
perform their duties in holding events, in activities, in public meetings, in 
consultations, in making public statements, and in making their report and 	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recommendations without making any findings or expressing any conclusion or 
recommendation, regarding the misconduct of any person, unless such findings 
or information has already been established through legal proceedings, by 
admission, or by public disclosure by the individual. Further, the Commission 
shall not make any reference in any of its activities or in its report or 
recommendations to the possible civil or criminal liability of any person or 
organization, unless such findings or information about the individual or institution 
has already been established through legal proceedings.171 
Through the removal of any possibility of criminal, civil or even reputational findings of 
fault, TRCs are designed to foster open and honest communication.   
In his autobiography which reflecting on his time as head of South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, Albie Sachs, questioned why so little truth came out of a 
court of law, “when so much emerged from the TRC.”172  He opined that the answer was 
in the differing objectives.  As discussed, courts are concerned with accountability in the 
narrow, individual sense.  The end result is punishment and/or compensation for proven 
wrongs.  The due process procedures adopted are designed to bring out proof, or 
disproof, rather than truth.  Inquiries and TRCs on the other hand, are focused on large 
episodes.  The main concern is, in contrast, not punishment or compensation but to 
achieve an understanding and acknowledgement by society of what happened so that 
the healing and, if necessary, processes of change, can start.  TRCs rely heavily on 
dialogue as the foundation for repair.173 
One of the mandates of the IRS TRC was to gather statements from former residents of 
the IRS and anyone else who may have been impacted by the schools and their 
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legacy.174  In doing so, the TRC dealt with extremely complex witness issues.  Most 
witnesses were indigenous, had a history of abuse that frequently included sexual 
abuse, many were elderly, many had substance abuse problems and many described a 
difficult relationship with settler society justice institutions including experiences of 
criminalization.175  In order to encourage witness participation, the TRC developed a 
broad range of procedures for evidence gathering.  This included a number of methods 
of providing statements, including audio/visual submissions, written statements and 
public presentations.  Additionally, as traumatized witnesses faced even more 
significant and specialized barriers to participation, the TRC sought to address these 
barriers in a culturally sensitive way.  Throughout the statements, ceremonial supports 
through contact with sacred objects, emotional support through touching and 
encouraging words and empathetic gestures were provided.176  No legal or other 
representation was permitted, however, survivors were permitted to bring support 
persons with them to the statement takings.  Jula Hughes, in her work looking at 
whether procedural innovations encouraged participation, noted that participation at the 
first National Event was smaller than anticipated by the TRC.177  Although the venue 
was crowded, fewer people than expected provided statements.  Subsequent regional 
hearings, however, were much better attended and the TRC found it necessary to 
discourage some from attending as it was anticipated in some cases that the demand 
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for statement-taking opportunities would exceed the capacity of both the community and 
the commissioners.178 
Recently, the Ontario Superior Court confirmed in two separate decisions the important 
role of TRCs in recording individual and collective truth-telling.  Part of the TRC’s 
mandate is the “creation of a legacy” that includes collection of records, taking 
statements from those involved, and classifying and preserving the materials.179  In the 
first decision, Justice Stephen Goudge said that Canada was under an obligation to 
“provide the documents in its possession or control that are reasonably required to 
assist the TRC to tell the story of the legacy of Indian residential schools.”180  The court 
was then asked to look at what to do with the individual testimonies of 40,000 Indian 
residential school survivors that had been provided to the TRC.  Justice Paul M. Perell 
held that there would be a 15-year retention period during which survivors can choose 
to have some of their documents spared from destruction.181  These two decisions 
confirm the important role TRCs play in recording history.  Although this testimony is not 
a traditional form of “evidence” like that adduced through court processes, the Ontario 
Supreme Court recognized its importance in the social history of Canada and in the 
process of reconciliation.   
In her work examining the IRS TRC and the Mackenzie Valley Inquiry, Kim Stanton, 
explores the institutional design strategies employed by the inquiry that may be of 
assistance to the TRC and assist future inquiries.  Starting from the view that inquiries, 	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in their basic form, “investigate an issue by gathering a broad spectrum of information in 
order to see the large context that gave rise to the problem” then making “policy 
recommendations to prevent a recurrence of the problem.”182  Stanton is clear that the 
Mackenzie Valley Commission has its differences from truth and reconciliation 
commissions, namely that it was not structure investigate a pattern of human-rights 
abuses that occurred over a number of years, and it was established to investigate a 
prospective issue rather than a retrospective one.  Rather, Stanton focuses on the 
manner in which Commissioner Berger conducted the inquiry and highlights features 
that can be associated with the truth commission model.  She argues that the public 
inquiry model should not be rejected as a means of addressing historical injustices in 
established democracies.183 
Commissioner Berger approached the Commission’s mandate with a focus on the 
social function of the inquiry of creating awareness of and public support for the inquiry 
process.  This in turn prompted social accountability with respect to the issues before 
him.  Recognizing the social function of inquiries, Berger included a paper as Appendix 
1 to his report about the Inquiry Process.  In the paper, he discusses Gerard Le Dain’s 
views of the “emerging function” of public inquiries, specifically the opening of issues to 
public discussion and providing a forum for the exchange of ideas.  Berger stated that 
“commissions of inquiry have become an important means for public participation in 
democratic decision-making as well as an instrument to supply informed advice to 
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government.”184  The Berger Inquiry was successful in educating the public in many 
respects both through the operation of the inquiry and its reports.  As Jull, commented 
“the Berger Inquiry became a national ‘teach-in’ and turning point in national 
consciousness.  Most importantly it introduced Northern indigenous voices and their 
needs to the Canadian public.”185  Throughout the five years of the inquiry, Berger’s 
credibility was unimpeachable.  This was in large part due to his commitment to 
openness and transparency in all areas of the inquiry process.   
The process of the Berger inquiry was not simple and straightforward.  Berger, 
recognizing the diverse range of views and issues his inquiry was facing, chose to 
combine different types of hearings including: preliminary, community, and formal.  In 
doing so, he clearly set out what types of evidence would be heard, from whom and 
how the evidence of each type of hearing would be weighed.186  The community 
hearings, for example focused on listening to members of the communities that would 
be directly affected by the pipeline.  Evidence gathered at these hearings was to be 
treated with the same respect and gravity as that taken from experts in formal hearings.  
Notably, Berger chose to keep lawyers in the background at community hearings and 
did not permit cross-examination of community members.  This, he argued, was to 
ensure that the community members would feel unfettered in their ability to speak 
before the inquiry.187  Similarly, Berger recognized that the information garnered at the 
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northern hearings and community hearings generated significant reaction from people in 
the south of the province.  Through hearings conducted in the south, Berger 
demonstrated that inquiries could be used to create a dialogue between different parts 
of a society.188 
When Commissioner Berger’s views are contrasted with the boycott by community 
groups of the more recent study commission portion Missing Women Commission of 
Inquiry, the question is raised as to what has changed in the last few decades that has 
led to the disenchantment with the public participation portion of public inquiries.  The 
Missing Women Commission attempted to adopt many of the techniques that proved so 
successful in the Berger Inquiry, different hearing types and locations, public education 
events and encouraging a dialogue between the northern and southern communities 
facing similar problems.  The difference, however, was that the Missing Women 
Commission was conducted under the new Public Inquiry Act.  Bound by rules that 
limited both the study and hearing commissions, Commissioner Oppal was not as free 
to design his own process.  Relying on the study commission powers to meet with 
members of northern communities, Commissioner Oppal was able to design a process 
that like the Berger Inquiry, put lawyers in the background and encouraged an open and 
unfettered dialogue.  However, information gained through these inquires was not able 
to be used in the fact finding portion of the inquiry.   This distinction led to an outcry that 
the study commission was a less important process and undermined its ability to 
engage the community.   The legislated distinction between the two types of inquiry is 
one of the most discernable representations of the judicialization of public inquiries.  	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Legislation governing public inquiries provides them with sufficient flexibility in process 
so as to fulfil the social function as demonstrated by the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline 
Commission. Negative experiences with public inquiries and frustration with inadequate 
political response to commissions’ recommendations led IRS negotiators to seek the 
establishment of a “truth commission.”189  Seeking a body that would perform the social 
function only represents the community’s desire for a process that engendered social 
accountability.190    There is, however, no reason that a public inquiry cannot perform 
both the social functions, including open dialogue, community participation and 
education and the legal investigative functions such as fact finding.  The end goal of 
many public inquiries is the development of forward-looking recommendations to 
address the issues uncovered by the inquiry.  Engaging communities that have been 
affected by the issues or events that led to the inquiry provides the commissioner with 
not only a greater understanding of the issues in question but also is likely to encourage 
a greater sense of responsibility to ensure that the recommendations are implemented.   
The six core elements of TRCs as described in the section above could easily be 
adopted by public inquiries.  TRCs have an important role to play in engaging and 
healing communities that have experienced tragedy.  Inquiries have a similar function in 
educating and engaging the community, however, are also able through legislative 
powers to ensure that all parties involved in events are heard from.  As a result of the 
coercive powers granted to inquiries, they are able to engage in a thorough 
investigation.  Recently, these investigations have been the focus of many inquiries.  
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However, it is evident from inquiries such as the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline and 
Walkerton that those inquiries that rely on both their investigative function and social 
engagement are the most successful.  Employing elements often associated with TRCs 
such the community engagement processes adopted in Walkerton encourages not only 
a greater sense of trust by the community in the inquiry process but also facilitates 
community healing.  The Missing Women Commission of Inquiry, however, 
demonstrates that in separating the functions of inquiries through strict legislation 
hinders an inquiry’s ability to flexibly move between dual mandates.   
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Conclusion 
“I am a firm believer in the people. If given the truth, they can be depended upon to 
meet any national crisis. The great point is to bring them the real facts.”191 Abraham 
Lincoln’s words highlight the importance of the investigative and social engagement 
functions of public inquiries.  Unlike any civil or criminal proceedings associated with the 
issues being addressed, fundamentally inquiries are established to seek facts and, 
ideally, the truth.  It is from this truth that meaningful and impactful policy 
recommendations can be developed.  
Regardless of what one might think of the justness of actual policy outcomes of public 
inquiries, my point is rather this: the influence of juridification over public inquiries binds 
their abilities to flexibly investigate and examine issues of public concern. Obscuring the 
public nature of inquiries through the increased use of juridified processes limits 
inquiries social and policy impacts.  These restrictions have led to a greater number of 
clashes between inquiries on one hand, bound by increasingly juridified processes and 
communities and social groups on the other, often with limited resources and 
experience in juridified processes.  The result is often inquiries, such as the Missing 
Women Inquiry, where participation is dominated by those with access to funding and 
resources rather than by individuals, organizations and/or communities most involved or 
impacted by the issues addressed by the inquiry. 
The inquiry process, initially developed as an alternative to criminal and civil 
proceedings, recognized the importance of flexibility and inclusion.  The migration of 	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elements of evidence law and disclosure practices, for example, restrict an inquiry’s 
ability to engage with the public.  Recent inquiries, most notably the Missing Women’s 
Commission, faced extremely difficult challenges engaging with community 
organizations and individuals.  Restricted by financial constraints and unable to 
participate in the lawyer dominated hearings, organizations, individuals and community 
groups saw the alternative processes developed by the inquiry as secondary and chose 
not to participate.  The experience of the Missing Women Commission should be seen 
as a cautionary warning to future inquiries.  The separation of investigative and policy 
processes requires careful consideration so as to ensure that all necessary voices are 
able to participate.   
As Ms. Stanton clearly noted, TRCs have a valuable place in Canadian society and 
should be considered in times of tragedy where a community requires healing, however, 
they are not capable of replacing public inquiries.  The investigative, social engagement, 
public education and policy development functions of inquiries are unique.  To suggest 
the two processes are interchangeable weakens the importance and place of both 
institutions.  The examination of TRCs in the context of public inquiries does, however, 
highlight the need to ensure that inquiries continue to engage in all of their functions, not 
just the investigative.  Pressures to juridify the public inquiry process will likely continue, 
however, it will be up to commissioners and their staff to ensure that the future inquiries 
remain true to their fundamental purposes.  The two case studies discussed, Walkerton 
and MWCI, demonstrate both how successful inquiries can be when juridification is 
resisted and the negative results that occur when the pressures are too great.  The 
MWCI was governed by a legislative framework that restricted its ability to create 
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practices and procedures that would allow for the investigative and policy processes to 
work together seamlessly.  Instead, the Commission was faced with boycotts and 
protests unhappy with the dual process and what many saw as an inferior process for 
those without access to sufficient funding.   
Although all future inquiries in BC will, unless the legislation is amended, be faced with 
the same challenges this does not mean that they are doomed to repeat the same 
mistakes as MWCI.  As discussed, there is not a single process or system that works for 
all inquiries.  Future inquiries, those faced by legislative restrictions and those with more 
open frameworks, will be required to develop processes that meet the needs of their 
mandate and the community in which they are operating.  By acknowledging, and 
resisting where necessary, the pressures of juridification while understanding the 
legislative framework under which an inquiry is called, there is no reason future inquiries 
cannot continue to serve the Canadian people for years to come.   
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